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Who benefits from public spending? Who bears the 
burden of taxation? How desirable is the distribution 
of net benefits from the operation of a tax-benefit 
system? This paper surveys basic concepts, methods, 
and modeling approaches commonly used to address 
these issues in the context of fiscal incidence analysis.  
The review covers the incidence of both taxation and 
public spending. Methodological points are supported 
by country cases. The effective distribution of benefits 
and burdens associated with fiscal policy depends on 
the size of the government, the distributive mechanisms 
involved, and the incentives properties of the policy 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction Group , Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is 
part of a larger effort in the network to provide guidance and disseminate methods of assessing the social impact of public 
policies. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at bessamanssah@worldbank.org.  
under consideration. This creates a need for analytical 
methods to account for both individual behavior and 
social interaction. The approaches reviewed include 
simple reduced form regression analysis, microsimulation 
models (both the envelope and discrete choice models), 
computable general equilibrium modeling, and 
approaches that link computable general equilibrium 
models to microsimulation models. Explicit modeling 
facilitates the construction of counterfactuals to back up 
causal analysis.  Social desirability is assessed on the basis 
of progressivity along with deadweight loss. 
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  Maintaining and improving the living standard of a population is commonly 
believed to be the ultimate objective of public policy and a fundamental expectation of 
the governed (Sen et al., 1987).  The living standard of an individual hinges critically on 
both collective and individual choices.  These choices shape available socioeconomic 
opportunities as well as the individual’s willingness and ability to identify and exploit 
such opportunities.  This view leads to two basic issues in public finance.  What should 
be the appropriate role of government in pursuit of this fundamental policy objective? 
How should resources be mobilized and deployed to support the fulfillment of that role? 
  The appropriate role of the government should not be considered in a vacuum.  It 
must be assessed in terms of its comparative advantage relative to the market.  Stiglitz 
(1997) argues that whenever there are imperfections of information or competition or 
incomplete markets there is a potential for government actions to improve living 
standards.  Essentially, he views the role of the government as establishing six types of 
infrastructure for the economy: educational, technological, financial, physical, 
environmental and social.  This is consistent with the three functions of government 
proposed by Musgrave (1959) namely: allocation,  distribution and stabilization.  
Accordingly, the government must intervene when market failure leads to Pareto 
inefficient outcomes (allocation); or when the private market outcome leaves some 
members of society with a level of living that is unacceptably low on the basis of 
prevailing norms (distribution
1); or when some resources are left underutilized 
(stabilization). 
  Equity is the cornerstone of social infrastructure and certainly one thing that 
cannot be promoted by the private market.  The World Development Report (WDR) 2006 
argues for the pursuit of equity on both intrinsic and instrumental grounds.  It defines 
equity in terms of a level playing field where individuals have equal opportunities to 
pursue freely chosen life plans and are spared from extreme deprivation in outcomes
2.  
                                                 
1 In a market economy, each person’s claim to available goods and services is limited to the amount of 
income obtainable from that person’s successful sale of something of value on the market.  Thus, 
distribution by the market system is based on quid pro quo (Lindblom 2001). 
2 Sen (1995) notes two broad dimensions to the concept of living standard.  In this framework, the standard 
of living can be thought of in terms of human functionings and capabilities.  Functionings represent the 
  1This definition implies that the pursuit of equity also entails that of poverty reduction.  
While recognizing the intrinsic value of equity, the report emphasizes its instrumental 
value for development by noting the complementarities between equity and prosperity.  
Indeed missing or failing markets prevent resources from flowing where returns would be 
highest.  If correcting such failures is not feasible or is too costly, then improved 
efficiency can be achieved through some form of redistribution of access to services, 
assets, or political influence.  It is further noted that inequitable institutions stemming 
from high levels of socio-political inequality can lead to high economic costs to the 
extent that such institutions tend to favor systematically powerful interest groups. 
  The purpose of this paper is to review basic concepts, methods and tools used in 
assessing the redistributive effect of public finance.  Empirical examples will also be 
discussed along the way.  The key issue of concern here is the appropriate distribution of 
the tax burden and the benefits from public expenditure.  It is instructive to frame such an 
evaluation within the broader logic of an allocation or distribution problem which arises 
in situations where a bundle of resources or burdens must be allotted individually to 
members of a group.  Young (1994) explains that such a problem can be analyzed in 
terms of the following three dimensions: (1) a supply decision by the relevant institution 
that determines the amount of the good or burden to distribute; (2) a distributive decision 
based on a set of the principles governing the allotment process (i.e. assignment of shares 
to eligible individuals); and (3) reactive decisions made by individuals in response to the 
incentives created by the above two institutional choices. 
In the context of taxation for instance, the supply dimension relates to the 
determination of the amount of tax to be levied given the desired level of expenditure.  
The personal income tax schedule is an outcome of a distributive rule which is usually 
based on the principle of progressivity.  Accordingly, the amount of tax owed by a 
household is generally a function of its ability to pay.  This ability is assessed on the basis 
                                                                                                                                                 
various living conditions achieved by an individual (i.e. outcomes), while capabilities relate to the ability of 
achieving functionings.  Capabilities define the freedom of choice, hence the opportunity set. Given this 
fundamental distinction, WDR 2006 argues that public policy should seek to equalize opportunities, not 
outcomes.  However, high inequality of outcomes across groups defined on the basis of circumstances 
beyond their control, is viewed as evidence of unequal opportunities. 
  2of the socioeconomic characteristics of the household
3.  The basic neoclassical model of 
labor supply provides a convenient framework to illustrate the response of taxpayers to 
the rate structure.  In this framework, labor supply is a consequence of optimal choice 
between income (or consumption that this income can buy) and leisure.  The imposition 
of a tax on earnings reduces the after-tax wage and hence, induces the taxpayer to want to 
work less (i.e. consume more leisure).  This is the substitution effect.  On the other hand, 
there is an income effect due to the fact that taxation reduces the worker’s level of 
income.  The taxpayer would want to work more to compensate for that loss.  The overall 
response to taxation will thus depend on which effect dominates. 
  Accounting for the behavioral response of socioeconomic agents to public policy 
is essential to minimize bias in the estimation of policy impact, and hence to avoid 
erroneous policy recommendations.  This accounting is also necessary for a proper 
evaluation of government intervention.  As noted by Stiglitz (1997), public intervention is 
warranted if it is aimed at a serious imperfection in the market place and it is designed in 
such a way that the perceived benefits outweigh the costs.  An important dimension of 
these costs is represented by the concept of excess burden.  This is the efficiency loss 
associated with change in behavior induced by distorted incentives due to policy 
implementation. Taxation, for instance, leads to a change in relative prices that can distort 
choices.  As a result socioeconomic agents experience welfare costs, which, when 
translated in money, exceed the amount of tax paid (Creedy 2004). 
  The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 focuses on the distribution of the 
tax burden.  It starts with a discussion of standard incidence analysis.  In general, this 
involves a positive analysis of the impact of public policy on the distribution of economic 
welfare within society.  In the particular case of taxation, the object of incidence analysis 
is to determine who ultimately bears the economic burden of taxation and to what extent.  
                                                 
3 Generally speaking, an allocation rule is a method of determining individual shares (in a distribution 
problem) on the basis of the nature of the good or burden, and the relevant characteristics of the claimants 
(Young 1994).  For instance, the benefit principle of taxation stipulates that citizens should be taxed on the 
basis of their willingness to pay for public services.  This is the idea underlying the Lindhal tax.  Given an 
optimal level of provision of a public good, the Lindhal tax for each person is equal to that optimal level 
times her or his willingness to pay for an extra unit of the good.  The optimal quantity of the good is the 
level at which the marginal cost of provision is equal to the overall willingness to pay.  However, the 
benefit approach to taxation is vulnerable to the free-rider problem.  There is incentive for everybody to 
underreport her willingness to pay. 
  3In this context, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between the statutory 
incidence of a tax and its economic incidence.  The former identifies the person who is 
obligated by law to remit a tax payment to the government while the latter refers to 
changes in economic well-being resulting from changes in behavior and equilibrium 
prices induced by taxation.  Various incidence assumptions made in tax incidence 
analysis will be reviewed in this section, which also covers issues related to equity in the 
distribution of the tax burden. 
The discussion of these equity issues will be organized around the concept of 
progressivity  and its connections to vertical and horizontal equity.  In general, a 
progressive policy favors the poor relative to the non-poor.  In the particular context of 
income taxation, a progressive tax is such that the average tax burden faced by an income 
unit is an increasing function of income.  Thus a better-off taxpayer would not only have 
a bigger tax liability but also pay a bigger share of his income in tax.  Given a pre-tax 
income distribution, a progressive tax shifts part of the tax burden from low to high 
incomes.  In so doing it exerts a redistributive effect on the distribution of income.  This 
redistributive effect can be viewed as a shift of part of total post-tax income from high to 
low income recipients (Lambert 2001).  The shifting of the tax burden is known as the 
disproportionality effect
4.  Both this and the redistributive effect underpin the 
measurement of progressivity.  We will consider the links between progression, 
horizontal and vertical equity in the context of unequal treatment of pre-tax equals
5.  To 
the extent feasible, some of these concepts will also be translated in the context of non-
income tax. 
Section 3 of this review focuses on the incidence of public expenditure.  One 
policy conclusion that emerges from tax incidence studies reveals the limited ability of 
tax policy to significantly change the distribution of income (Martinez-Vazquez 2008).  
This situation shifts the redistributive function of fiscal policy on public spending.  The 
potential impact of public expenditure on the distribution of economic welfare depends 
on the level and type of spending as well as on the efficiency of such spending.   
                                                 
4 As income increases, the tax burden increases more than proportionately. 
5 Lambert (2001) argues that progression is a meaningful feature of income taxation only in the case of 
social homogeneity, i.e. all income units are of the same type.  It therefore makes sense to model tax 
liability as a function of income alone. 
  4Expenditure incidence analysis is mainly concerned with public spending designed to 
improve equity.  In this section, we review the main methods used to assess the 
distributional impact of public expenditure.  The general approach to benefit incidence 
analysis is analogous to tax incidence analysis.  It is a matter of identifying who benefits 
from public spending and ascertaining the social desirability of the resulting distribution 
of benefits.  This section also reviews simple methods of accounting for behavioral 
responses to public spending.  Finally we discuss the combined incidence of taxes and 
public spending. 
  A key methodological message emerging from this review relates to the important 
role played by individual behavior and social interaction in determining fiscal incidence.  
Accordingly, section 4 of this review focuses on modeling frameworks currently used in 
fiscal incidence analysis.  It starts out with a discussion of two categories of 
microsimulation models.  The first is based on the envelope theorem of consumer theory 
while the second is framed within the logic of random utility models.  The section ends 
with a review of fiscal incidence analysis within a general equilibrium framework.  It 
considers respectively analytical and applied models, and ways of linking a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model to a microsimulation module. 
  Concluding remarks are made in section 5, focusing on methodological as well as 
on policy lessons. 
 
2.  The Burden of Taxation  
 
  The burden of taxation is the change in individual and social welfare induced by a 
tax system.  When real income is used as an indicator of economic welfare, the tax 
burden is measured by loss in real income
6.  Who really bears the burden of taxation?  
How desirable is the effective distribution of the tax burden?  These two questions 
underlie the evaluation of the distribution of the tax burden in a given society.  In this 
section, we review concepts and methods designed to help answer these basic questions.  
Tax incidence analysis seeks to identify the people who ultimately bear the tax burden.  
                                                 
6 Hence, the burden depends on real allocations and not on the price level or choice of numéraire.  What 
matters in the context of incidence analysis is how changes in relative output prices and relative factor 
prices affect policy-relevant socioeconomic groups (Fullerton and Metcalf 2002). 
  5Social desirability is a matter of value judgments.  Here we focus on progressivity to 
assess fairness on the basis of ability to pay.  Finally, we note that progressivity comes at 
a cost since there is a welfare loss associated with distortions induced by taxation. 
 
2.1. Tax Incidence 
 
Tax Shifting 
  To obtain the effective distribution of the tax burden, it is necessary to identify as 
accurately as possible the people who end up bearing the burden of the tax in question 
and the extent of their share of that burden.  In general, taxes are imposed on economic 
transactions along the production and distribution chain.  Tax shifting reflects the fact that 
the imposition of a tax at a particular point on this chain may end up affecting economic 
welfare of people at different points.  The possibility of shifting the tax burden stems 
from the fact that socioeconomic agents can change their behavior in response to a tax, 
subject to the prevailing institutional arrangements.  In a market economy, the burden of 
taxation is channeled mainly through changes in the prices of traded goods and services.  
Thus, people bear the burden of a tax when the imposition of the tax induces a change in 
the relative prices of the goods and services they buy and sell
7.  In addition, a tax may 
affect the prices of untaxed goods and services that are substitutes or complements of the 
taxed ones.  Such price changes are interpreted as “implicit” taxation. 
  As a rule of thumb, the extent to which a tax can be shifted and hence who ends 
up bearing the burden depend on the alternatives available to the parties in the taxed 
transaction.  Thus, one is less likely to bear the tax burden when he or she has better 
alternatives to what is taxed (Slemrod and Bakija 1996).  In the case of taxes on labor 
income, leisure or unpaid work at home are the alternatives open to workers.  For the 
employers, the alternative to hiring workers is determined by the ability to switch to more 
capital-intensive modes of production.  Thus, a tax on labor income can be shifted to the 
employers if workers have better alternatives than employers.  The same principle applies 
to other categories of taxes.  For instance, the estimation of the distribution of the burden 
                                                 
7 In a market economy, changes in prices affect agents’ demand and supply behavior, as well as their 
revenue and welfare.  
  6of the corporate income tax entails an analysis of the interaction between stakeholders, 
employees and costumers.  One possibility is that the stockholders would bear the burden 
in the short run.  In the medium to long run, changes in stock prices will make non-
corporate investments more attractive.  The returns in the non-corporate sector will fall 
due to increase demand.  This represents some shifting of the burden of the corporate 
income tax to holders of other forms of wealth. 
  In a particular market, the degree of shifting depends on the elasticity of demand 
and supply, and on market structure.  Stern (1987) demonstrates how this works for a 
specific tax
8 within a partial-equilibrium framework.  Let t stand for a tax per unit of 
output in a competitive market.  If q is the consumer price, the producer price is given 
by .  Furthermore, let η and ε stand respectively for the elasticity of supply and 
that of demand.  The effect of this tax on prices is defined by the following expressions.  
For the consumer price, we have: 






= .  The effect on the producer prices is: 




= .  For small taxes, the producer price is very close to the consumer price 





.  In general, the more inelastic part of the market will bear 
the greater share of the tax burden
9.  For instance, if the demand elasticity is equal to 
zero, the consumer will bear 100 percent of the tax burden.  In a similar fashion, the 
incidence of a payroll tax can be analyzed in terms of supply and demand elasticities 
(Salanié 2003; Fullerton and Metcalf 2002). 
 
Incidence Assumptions 
Because economic agents can change their behavior in response to taxation and 
thereby shift the tax burden to other actors, it is evident that the allocation of the tax 
                                                 
8 A specific tax (t) adds a given amount of money to a unit price of a good or factor.  It thus raises the price 
from p to (p+t).  An ad valorem tax (τ) is assessed as a fraction of the unit price.  In this case, the price 
changes from p to p(1+τ). 
9 Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) note that, in a perfectly competitive market, the economic incidence of a tax 
depends exclusively on behavior and not on legislative intent. 
  7burden to policy-relevant socioeconomic groups
10 hinges critically on the assumptions 
made about this behavior and the interaction among economic agents.  It is difficult in 
practice to obtain an accurate estimate of tax shifting.  Most empirical studies rely on data 
on the sources and uses of income in each socioeconomic group to construct the 
distribution of the tax burden on the basis of some assumptions about incidence.  The 
quality of the results thus depends on the extent to which such assumptions are 
reasonable and defensible (Slemrod and Bakija 1996). 
Martinez-Vazquez (2008) describes a set of assumptions used in conventional tax 
incidence analysis.  Given that the role of incidence assumptions is to facilitate the 
allocation of the tax burden to different income groups, they rely heavily on the fact that 
income sources and expenditure patterns vary significantly among such groups.  For 
instance, one can expect income from capital to be concentrated in the highest tail of the 
income distribution.  In certain countries, this component of income can also be found in 
the lowest end of the distribution due to retired workers who may be living off their past 
savings. 
The typical assumptions include the following.  (1) personal income tax is paid by 
the income recipient; (2) the burden of payroll and social security taxes fall entirely on 
workers; (3) three categories of assumptions can be made about the shifting pattern of 
corporate income taxes: (a) shareholders bear the full burden, (b) all capital owners bear 
the burden due to equalization of after-tax rates of return on all forms of capital, (c) half 
of the burden rests on all owners of capital and the other half is passed on to consumers in 
the form of higher consumer prices; (4) consumption taxes are fully shifted to consumers.  
In general, conventional analysis assumes that the burden of direct taxes falls on the 
owners of factors of production, while the burden of indirect taxes is borne fully by 
consumers (Martinez-Vazquez 2008). 
These assumptions have also been made in the case of Chile (Engel, Galetovic 
and Raddatz 1999).  These authors also assume that business tax is not passed on to 
consumers based on the observation that all types of businesses are subject to this tax.  
Table 2.1 shows their results in terms of the distribution of the tax burden in 1996 by 
                                                 
10 One conventional type of socioeconomic groups used in incidence analysis is to order the population in 
increasing order of some welfare indicator (e.g. income or consumption expenditure) and allocate 
individuals to income deciles or quintiles. 
  8deciles.  The second and third columns of this table show the distribution of both pre-tax 
and after-tax income.  The wealthiest deciles receives more that 40 percent of pre-tax 
income and about 41 percent of after-tax income while the poorest receives about 1.4 
percent of each type of income. 
 












1 1.45  1.40  14.44  0.00  11.0  3.42 
2 2.74  2.63  16.0  0.00  11.8  4.20 
3 3.77  3.61  15.8  0.00  11.4  4.33 
4 4.73  4.59  15.2  0.00  10.9  4.25 
5 5.57  5.47  15.0  0.01  10.7  4.21 
6 6.76  6.64  14.3  0.04  10.2  4.07 
7 8.22  8.20  13.8  0.11  9.7  4.0 
8 10.60  10.61  13.1  0.23  9.0  3.85 
9 15.42  15.75  12.2  0.62  8.0  3.54 
10 40.75  41.09  11.8  2.54  6.3  2.96 
Source: Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz (1999); Note: the entries are in percentage. 
 
  The last three columns of the table show the percentage of income that each decile 
pays in taxes considering respectively the whole tax system, the income tax, the value-
added tax (VAT) and other taxes.  These results reveal the tax burden is 
disproportionately borne by the poor.  For instance, the second decile is the group that 
pays the highest percentage of its income in taxes, 16 percent compared to the 12 percent 
paid by the wealthiest group. 
  Shah and Whalley (1991) caution that, a mechanical application of the 
conventional incidence analysis to developing countries can lead to significantly 
erroneous results and hence to wrong policy recommendations.  Indeed, this standard 
analysis assumes an institutional setting that may not prevail in developing countries, 
namely a competitive market economy.  For a proper tax incidence analysis in developing 
countries, these authors urge that account be taken of the following special features such 
  9as: informal sector, rural-urban migration, credit-rationing, extent of unionization, tax 
evasion, foreign and public ownership of firms.  The presence of these factors requires 
special shifting assumptions, which may reverse the incidence pattern implied by 
conventional assumptions.  For instance, effective price controls may prevent producers 
from shifting sales and excise taxes to consumers, thus rendering invalid the conventional 
assumption that such taxes are fully shifted forward to consumers.  Rural-urban migration 
may lead to a partial shift of income tax burden from urban onto rural workers.  This 
cautionary note from Shah and Whalley underscores the importance of modeling 
explicitly and accurately individual behavior and social interaction in improving the 
estimation of the distribution of the tax burden.  We review modeling issues in section 4 




  Incidence analysis as discussed above is largely a positive exercise designed to 
reveal who bears the burden of taxation, and hence the distribution of that burden.  The 
next issue of interest relates to social desirability of the observed distribution of the tax 
burden.  As noted in the introduction, this is a normative issue that must be settled on the 
basis of chosen value judgments.  The progressivity principle is based on vertical equity 
(VE) which requires that differences in people’s circumstances be appropriately taken 
into account in both the formulation and implementation of public policy. 
It is commonly accepted that the tax burden must be distributed according to an 
indicator of the ability to pay (usually some indicator of the living standard).  In 
particular, a progressive income tax is imposed in such a way that taxpayers at higher 
income brackets pay a higher proportion of their income in taxes.  The principle of 
horizontal equity (HE) requires an equal treatment of pretax equals.  We will see that the 
violation of this principle reduces the redistributive effect of a progressive tax
11. 
This section focuses on three topics: (1) measurement, (2) incentive properties, 
and (3) the ability of a tax system to redistribute income and wealth.  The discussion of 
                                                 
11 In the case of income taxation, Lambert (2001) notes that if, by “identical circumstances” we mean 
“identical income levels”, then a tax schedule that is a function only of income will ensure horizontal 
equity, regardless of its progressive nature. 
  10measurement issues will be based mainly on a simple income tax model where the 
relevant population is assumed to be socially homogeneous with respect to non-income 
attributes.  This implies that tax liability will be the same for income units with the same 
level of income.  The model further assumes that both tax and after-tax income are 
increasing function of pre-tax income
12 (Lambert 2001).  The results derived from this 
simple model will then be generalized to the case of social heterogeneity. 
 
Table 2.2: Alternative Tax Options for Australia 
 
Expenditure Group  Option A Option B 
Clothing and Footwear  0.30  0.30 
Furniture and Appliances  0.30  0.30 
Motor Vehicles and Parts  0.40  0.30 
Recreation Items  0.20  0.30 
Miscellaneous 0.20  0.30 
House-Building Payments 0.40.  0.30 
   Source: Creedy (2001) 
Measurement 
The burden associated with a progressive tax is disproportionately distributed in 
favor of the worse off while exerting an equalizing effect on the distribution of the living 
standard.  Measures of progressivity can therefore be developed either from the 
disproportionality effect or from the equalizing effect of the tax under consideration.  In 
the case of income tax, assuming a homogeneous population with respect to tax-relevant 
attributes such as marital status or family size, progressivity can be established by 
plotting the ratio of the amount paid in tax to income against income.  If this is an 
increasing function, the tax is progressive.  It is a decreasing function of income for a 
regressive tax
13.  The ratio is constant for a proportional tax.  Lambert (2001) explains 
                                                 
1 ) ( 0 ; ) ( 0 < ′ ≤ < ≤ x t x x t
12 Analytically, this model can be represented by a tax function t(x) with the following properties: 
, where x represents pre-tax income. 
13 One can also measure the degree of tax progression along income scale by considering the so-called 
measures of local or structural progression.  One such measure compares the marginal and average tax 
rates.  For a tax schedule to be progressive, it is necessary and sufficient to have the marginal rate greater 
than the average rate for all income levels (Lambert 2001). 
  11that any progressive income tax is equivalent to a flat tax of equal yield combined with 
appropriate rich-to-poor transfers. 
 
Table 2.3. Ratio of Equivalent Variations to Total Expenditure 
 
Weekly Expenditure Option A Option B
200 0.075  0.078 
400 0.098  0.102 
600 0.116  0.118 
800 0.128  0.129 
1000 0.138  0.138 
1200 0.147  0.145 
1400 0.160  0.157 
   Source: Creedy (2001) 
 
The impact of indirect taxes on individual welfare is channeled through changes 
in commodity prices.  This suggests the use of welfare measures such as equivalent 
variation (EV) or compensating variation (CV) as indicators of tax burden.  These two 
measures can be defined in terms of the expenditure function which represents the 
minimum level of expenditure required to achieve a given level of utility given the 
prevailing prices (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980).  Denote this function by e(p,u), where p 
is a vector of prices and u stands for utility.  If a tax induces a price change from p
0 to p
1, 
the equivalent variation is the maximum an individual would be willing to pay to avoid 
the tax and the associated change in prices.  This can be formally written 
as: .  Analogously, the compensating variation is the 
minimum amount of income an individual should be given in compensation for the price 
change in order to keep her as well off as before the change.  Formally, this is defined 
as: .  Creedy (2001) uses the ratio of equivalent variation to 
total expenditure to assess the progressivity of alternative indirect tax structures in 
)] , ( ) , ( [
1 0 1 1 u p e u p e EV − =
)] , ( ) , ( [
0 0 0 1 u p e u p e CV − =
  12Australia.  The two regimes tax only goods whose budget shares rise with income.  Table 
2.2. gives the expenditure groups
14 and the associated tax rates 
  Table 2.3 show normalized equivalent variations for a range of weekly total 
expenditure in dollars.  Both tax options would be progressive since the normalized EV 
increases with the level of expenditure. 
The disproportionality property of the tax burden can also be established by 
comparing concentration curves.  Let x and y be any two attributes of income units e.g. 
pre- and post-tax income levels.  Suppose that the population is ranked in increasing 
order of x, so that p represents the lowest 100p percent of the distribution of x.  For each 
p between zero and one, the concentration curve for y with respect to x shows the share 
of y going to this lowest percentile.  Let LX(p) be the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income and 
KT(p) the concentration curve for tax payments.  The term A(p)= [LX(p) - KT(p)] 
measures the distance between the two curves.  The distance measures, for the lowest-
ranked 100p percent of the population, the difference between their share in pre-tax 
income and their share in the tax burden. 
If this is positive for all p, the concentration curve for tax payments lies entirely 
below the pre-tax income Lorenz curve.  In other words, the lowest-ranked 100p percent 
of income units receive a greater share of pretax income than of the tax burden (Lambert 
2001).  To better understand the departure from proportionality in the distribution of the 
tax burden, note that LX(p) also represents the concentration curve for tax liabilities 
under an equal-yield flat tax.  Under this interpretation, A(p) represents the fraction of the 
tax burden shifted from low to high incomes.  The Kakwani index of progressivity is 
equal to twice area under A(p).  This reduces to the difference between the concentration 
coefficient for tax liabilities and the Gini coefficient for pre-tax income, and can be 
written explicitly as: X T K G C − = π . 
  Analogously, the progressivity of a tax can be assessed on the basis of its 
equalizing or redistributive effect.  This entails the comparison of pre-tax income 
distribution with that of post-tax income.  Let KY(p) stands for the concentration curve of 
                                                 
14 These six expenditure groups form a subset of 14 expenditure components considered by the author.  The 
non-taxed groups include: Current housing costs; electricity, gas and other fuels; food and non-alcoholic 
beverages; spirits, beer and wine; tobacco; postal and telephone charges; health services; and personal care 
products. 
  13the after tax income distribution.  Now, B(p)= [KY(p) - LX(p)] shows the fraction of post-
tax income shifted from high to low incomes by the tax.  This term is positive for a 
progressive tax.  This characterization is based on interpreting LX(p)  now as the 
concentration curve for after tax income induced by an equal-yield flat tax (Lambert 
2001).  The Reynolds-Smolensky index of the redistributive effect is equal to twice the 
area under B(p).  It reduces into the difference between the Gini coefficient of pre-tax 
income and the concentration coefficient of the after tax income, and can be written as: 
Y X RS C G − = π . 
  Lambert (2001) shows that the measure based on the equalizing effect and the one 
based on disproportionality are related through the following relation, where g stands for 













.  In other words, the amount of income shifted down the income scale by 
a progressive tax is a function of the total tax ratio and the disproportionality effect. 
  It is important to note that the above results hinges on the assumption of social 
homogeneity and the fact that the marginal tax rate is less than one.  Under these 
restrictive assumptions, KY(p) is also the Lorenz curve of post tax income distribution.  
This is why we were able to call B(p) the redistributive effect.  When the tax system 
accounts for social heterogeneity, the tax schedule will depend on income and non-
income attributes such as marital status and family size.  In this general case, reranking of 
income units can occur.  Now, let LY(q) stand for the Lorenz curve of the post tax income 
distribution.  The redistribution effect can now be written as follows (Lambert 2001): 
  () ( Y Y T X X Y L K K L
g
g
L L − − −
−
≡ −
1 )       (2.1) 
The above relation implies the following: 
  () ( Y Y X T Y X C G G C
g
g
G G − − −
−
≡ −
1 )       (2.2) 
  The above two expressions apply to any tax system beyond the simple model we 
started with.  The left hand side of (2.2) now represents the Reynolds-Smolensky index of 
the redistributive effect of the tax.  The first term on the right hand side of the same 
  14expression is a function of Kakwani’s index of progressivity.  The last term on the right 
reflects the extent of reranking in the transition from the pre-tax to the post-tax income 
distribution
15. 
  Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), here after AJL, show that when tax 
liabilities are determined on the basis of income and non-income factors, differences in 
tax treatment at given levels of (equivalent) income are bound to arise.  On top of this 
possible unequal treatment of equals, the tax system may also imply reranking among 
unequals.  These authors demonstrate
16 that the redistributive effect of a 
tax, , can be written as a function of three factors: (1) the vertical or 
progressivity effect (V), (2) a measure of classical horizontal inequity (H), and the 
Atkinson-Plotnick index of reranking (R).  Formally, we have: 
Y X G G RE − =
           (2.3)  R H V RE − − =
Assuming that the population has been divided in groups of pretax equals, the various 
components of (2.3) are defined as follows.   ( ) b X G G V − = , where Gb the between group 
Gini coefficient of the distribution of post-tax income.  Classical horizontal inequity is 
measured by: , where αk is the product of the population share and the post-
tax income share in group k, and Gk is the Gini index of inequality in the distribution of 
after-tax income in group k.  Reranking is given by the last term in (2.2): .  
The fact that these components are positive implies that both horizontal inequity and 
reranking reduce the vertical or progressivity effect. 
∑ =
k
k kG H α
() Y Y C G R − =
  Hyun and Lim (2005) use the AJL methodology to examine the redistributive 
effect of the Korean income tax system over three years: 1991, 1996 and 2000.  Their 
empirical results based on microdata sets collected by the Korean National Statiatical 
office are presented in table 2.4.  The last three rows of this table show the normalized 
version of the three components of the redistributive effect as a percentage of RE.  The 
                                                 
∑ + + =
k
k k b Y R G G α
15 It is important to keep in mind that in the benchmark model of income tax where both tax and post-tax 
income increase with pre-tax income, there is no reranking as we move from the pre-tax to the post-tax 
distribution of income.  In other words, the benchmark case implements a rank-presenving transformation 
of pre-tax incomes into post-tax income. 
16 Their demonstration hinges on the following decomposition of the Gini coefficient of post-tax income 
distribution: G . 
  15results show a positive redistribution effect for each year since the Gini coefficient falls 
after tax.  The pattern of the distribution of the equalizing effect across the vertical, 
horizontal and reranking components is similar over the three years.  The results also 
indicate a fairly high level of horizontal inequity.  Using 1991 as base year, the authors 
Table 2.4. The Redistributive Effect of Income Tax in Korea 
 
Indicator 1991  1996  2000 
Gini before tax  0.34718  0.33682  0.40077 
Gini after tax  0.32455  0.31877  0.37899 
RE 0.0222631 0.018041 0.021782
Kakwani 0.41158  0.40158  0.42643 
Average Tax Rate 0.065178  0.066025 0.069124
V 0.028697  0.028389 0.028033
H 0.00523  0.008924 0.005491
R 0.000836  0.001424 0.000760
V(%) 126.8  157.35  128.70 
H(%) 23.11  49.46  25.20 
R(%) 3.7  7.89  3.49 
   Source: Hyun and Lim (2005) 
make a normalized comparison of these components over time.  They find that the 
redistributive effect was highest in 1991 and lowest in 1996.  They explain the 1996 
outcome by observing that it is also the year with the highest level of horizontal inequity.  
In general, they conclude that there is room for improving the redistributive power of 
income tax in Korea by abolishing most allowances and exemptions. 
  To confirm that the AJL methodology applies equally well to indirect taxes, we 
present in table 2.5 the results of an evaluation of the redistributive effect of the pre-2000 
indirect tax system in Australia by Creedy (2001).  To account for demand responses, the 
author derives demand elasticities and welfare changes on the basis of a linear 
expenditure system (LES) using data on the socioeconomic groups listed in table 2.5.  
The 14 expenditure components include those listed in table 2.2 and in footnote 14.   
However, the author explains that the computation of the three components of 
redistribution presented in table 2.5 does not account for demand changes in order to 
  16maintain the full variation of household budget shares.  It is this heterogeneity in budget 
shares that explains horizontal inequity and reranking. 
  The redistributive effect shown in the second column of table 2.5 reveals that the 
pre-2000 indirect tax system in Australia was slightly regressive overall and for most 
household types except for couples with no children and at least one retiree and for single 
retirees.  Reranking is more substantial than horizontal inequity.  It can be noted that the 
favorable redistribution towards type 3 and type 10 household would be more significant 
in the absence of the reranking effect.  Reranking reduces redistribution for type 3 by 
about 32 percent and by 22 percent for type 10.  The largest amount of reranking is 
observed for single parents with one dependent child.  The author explains that this 
reranking is largely due to exemptions working through heterogeneous budget shares. 
 
Table 2.5. The Redistributive Effect of Indirect Taxes in Australia 
 
Household type  RE  V  V(%)  H(%)  R(%) 
1. All households  -0.0013 -0.0009 71.39  0.66  27.94
2. Couple, no children  -0.0021 -0.0017 80.55  0.05  19.39
3. Couple, no children, at least one  retired  0.0018 0.0025 132.84  1.32 31.53
4. Couple, one dependent child  -0.0017 -0.0013 76.29  1.45  25.16
5. Couple, two dependent children  -0.0013 -0.0010 75.77  1.51  25.74
6. Couple, three or more dependent children -0.0027 -0.0024 87.56  0.13  12.57
7. Single parent, one dependent child -0.0013 -0.0008 64.17  2.42  38.25
8. Single two or more dependent children  -0.0020 -0.0016 79.29  1.92  18.79
9. Single, not retired  -0.0038 -0.0032 84.91  0.35  15.44
10. Single, retired  0.0029  0.0036  123.46  1.27  22.19
  Source: Creedy (2001) 
 
Urban and Lambert (2008) explain that the AJL machinery reviewed above works 
only when applied to groups of exact equals.  They observe that typical real-world 
datasets rarely contain exact equals.  In such circumstances, analysts use groups of close 
equals to identify the horizontal effect of a tax system.  Such groups are defined on the 
basis of a chosen bandwidth that determines the maximum difference between the pre-tax 
incomes of any two individuals considered as near equals.  Urban and Lambert identify 
  17three distinct forms of reranking that are bound to arise in the case of close equals.  In 
moving from pre-tax to post-tax distribution of income, the following types of reranking 
may take place: within-group reranking, entire-group reranking, and the type of reranking 
encountered in the AJL framework. 
  These components of reranking can be identified through the following process 
fully described by the authors.  Start with income units ordered by pre-tax income, and 
select a bandwidth to create close equals groups.  Now, consider ordering units within 
each group only according to post-tax income.  The comparison of the resulting 
distribution with the initial one identifies within-group reranking.  Starting now with the 
new distribution (that accounts for within group reranking), reorder whole groups in 
increasing order of group mean post-tax income (i.e so that the group mean post-tax 
income increases monotonically from one group to the next).  The transition from the 
precedent distribution to this new one reveals entire-group reranking.  Finally, sort this 
last distribution in increasing order of post-tax income.  The comparison of the result 
with the distribution from which it was derived reveals the AJL reranking.  The 
phenomenon of significance at the last step is that some income units can “get out” of 
their original group and take up positions in different groups. 
  What then are the implications for the computation of the components of the 
redistributive effect?  We present here the key methodological recommendation proposed 
by the authors.  The measurement framework relies on the comparison of Lorenz and 
concentration curves associated with transitional distributions from pre-tax to post-tax 
income distribution and various orderings of income units.  In this context, they refer to 
the vertical effect as the full vertical effect and to the appropriate horizontal effect as type 
2 horizontal effect
17.  The reranking effect that includes all three forms described above is 
called the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani (APK) reranking
18. 
                                                 
17 Type one reranking is associated with AJL methodology.  In that case horizontal inequity refers to 
inequality in the distribution of post-tax income among exact equals.  Type 2 is assessed on the basis of 
person-by-person departure of actual post-tax income from a counterfactual distribution free of horizontal 
inequity (Urban and Lambert 2008). 
18 The three forms of reranking can be computed separately as follows. Compute the Lorenz curve of pre-
tax income based on an ordering that ranks income units by pre-tax income level and exact equals by post-
tax income level.  Call this ordering 1 and compute the concentration curve of post-tax income associated 
with this ordering. Next, consider the ordering of income units by post-tax income level.  Call this ordering 
2 and compute the Lorenz curve of the distribution of post-tax income.  The APK reranking is based on the 
comparison of the concentration curve of ordering 1 with the Lorenz curve of post-tax income.  It can be 
  18The computation of both the full vertical and type two horizontal effects entails a 
counterfactual distribution.  Given the pre-tax and post-tax distributions, order income 
units by pre-tax income level, breaking possible ties with post-tax income (i.e. exact 
equals, if any, are ranked by post-tax income).  Compute the Lorenz curve of pre-tax 
income (LX) and the concentration curve of post-tax income (KY) associated with this 
ordering.  Compute the Lorenz curve for post-tax income (LY) as well.  Let gk be the 
share of total pre-tax income taken from a given group of close equals (k=1,2,…m).  The 
counterfactual income distribution, Yc , is obtained by reducing the pre-tax income in 
each group by the relevant fraction gk. Compute also the concentration curve of this 
counterfactual distribution (KC) with respect to pre-tax income.  The full vertical effect is 
based on the comparison of LX with KC.  Its index measure is given by the difference 
between the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income and the concentration coefficient of the 
counterfactual income.  Type 2 horizontal effect is based on the comparison of KC and 
KY.  The corresponding summary index is equal to the concentration coefficient of post-
tax income minus the concentration coefficient of counterfactual income.  As noted in 
footnote 18, the overall or APK ranking effect is based on KY and LY.  Hence, the 
redistributive effect is equal to the full vertical effect, minus type 2 horizontal effect, 
minus APK reranking
19.  Formally, we write: . 
APK R H V RE − − =
* *
  In closing this discussion of measurement issues, we would like to point out that 
the progressivity of indirect taxes can also be assessed on the basis of the price elasticity 
of poverty measures (e.g Watts or members of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family).  In 
this framework, the impact of taxes on individual welfare is calculated with the help of an 
indirect utility function.  This is the maximum level of utility attainable given a budget 
                                                                                                                                                 
summarized by the difference between the Gini coefficient of post-tax income and the concentration 
coefficient of ordering 1.  Now define ordering 3 as the situation where income units within group are 
ranked by post-tax income level while groups are ranked by pre-tax mean.  Compute the concentration of 
post-tax income associated with this ordering.  Within group reranking is based on the comparison of the 
concentration curve of ordering 1 with that of ordering 3.  Its summary index is equal to concentration 
index 3 minus concentration index 1.  Now unscramble ordering 3 by lining up groups according to their 
post-tax means, ceteris paribus.  Call this ordering 4, and compute the associated concentration curve of 
post-tax income.  Entire group reranking is determined by the comparison of concentration curve 3 and 4 
and can be summarized by concentration index 4 minus concentration index 3.  Finally, AJL reranking is 
based on the comparison of concentration curve 4 with the Lorenz curve of post-tax income.  The 
associated summary index is equal to the Gini coefficient of post-tax income minus concentration index 4. 
19 Urban and Lambert also show that the full vertical effect is equal to the AJL vertical effect plus entire 
group reranking.  Type 2 horizontal effect is equal to AJL horizontal effect minus within group reranking. 
  19and the prevailing prices.  The approach also relies on the elasticity interpretation of 
budget shares.  Under certain conditions, it can be shown that when the price of a 
commodity increases by one percent, say, real income declines by an amount equal to the 
corresponding budget share (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980).  This is the variable that links 
changes in individual welfare due to tax induced price changes to changes in poverty.  
Hence the progressivity of a given indirect tax hinges critically on the variation of budget 
share as expenditure increases.  A basic conclusion that emerges from this approach is 
that a progressive commodity tax imposes a higher burden on high-income households by 
placing a higher tax rate on commodities that constitute a higher proportion of the budget 
of these households.  The reader interested in more details about this methodology is 
referred to Essama-Nssah (2007) or Bibi and Duclos (2007). 
 
Incentive Properties and Welfare Cost 
  As noted earlier, socioeconomic agents can change their behavior in response to 
taxation subject to institutional constraints.  This distortion of economic behavior 
response underlies tax shifting and can cause significant welfare loss
20.  This is easily 
understood in the context of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics 
establishing the Pareto optimality of the competitive equilibrium (Salanié 2003).  In a 
pre-tax equilibrium, optimal decisions taken by consumers lead the equality between 
marginal rates of substitution and relevant relative prices.  Similarly, on the supply side, 
firms equate marginal rates of technical substitution to relative prices.  Taxation 
introduces distortions to the extent that it leads various agents to perceive different 
relative prices.  Consumers may be looking at tax-inclusive prices while the producers are 
looking at pre-tax prices.  This divergence in signals received by both sides of the market 
induces a misallocation of resources which carries with it a welfare loss (beyond the tax 
revenue collected) known as deadweight loss or excess burden of taxation.  It is 
important to note that deadweight loss would occur even if the revenue collected were to 
be returned to the consumers. 
                                                 
20 A tax reform can be evaluated on the basis of the marginal social cost of available options for raising 
revenue.  The marginal cost of funds is equal to the fall in social welfare per unit of revenue raised (Stern 
1987).  In the context of indirect taxes, if the marginal social cost of taxing commodity j is less than the 
social cost of taxing commodity k, it would be desirable, other things being equal, to increase the tax on j 
and reduce the one on k by the same amount. 
  20  It is instructive and useful to consider the effect of taxes on work effort.  Indeed, 
the evaluation of the impact of a welfare-to-work policy requires a careful consideration 
of the labor supply decisions of both those individuals who are currently working and 
those who may be induced to enter the market by the reform.  This entails an 
understanding of changes in wages, participation and hours of work.  Labor supply 
models attempt to explain changes in participation and working hours.  Such changes are 
linked to variation in the structure of real wages and to reforms in the tax and benefit 
system. 
  Standard labor supply models are framed within the logic of individual choice 
between consumption goods and leisure.  This framework helps one establish the 
determinants of labor supply.  It is usually assumed that more of both consumption and 
leisure is preferred to less.  There are two basic income sources: activity within and 
without the labor market.  Given a wage rate and non-wage income, the consumer is 
assumed to maximize utility (a function of consumption and leisure) subject to the full 
income constraint based on time endowment.  In this context, the wage is viewed both as 
a price and the opportunity cost of leisure.  A change in the wage rate has both an income 
and substitution effects.  For instance, taxing wage income reduces the after-tax wage 
rate.  This will induce the taxpayer to choose more leisure and less work.  This is the 
substitution effect.  At the same time the tax reduces the level of disposable income so 
that the worker may want to work more to make up for the loss.  This is the income effect.  
The combination of these two effects determines individual labor supply. 
  A tax on labor may also affect an individual decision to participate in the labor 
market or not.  The determining factor here is the reservation wage.  It depends on the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and determines the 
conditions of participation in the labor market (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004).  Salanié 
(2003) analyzes a simple situation where an individual faces the choice between not 
working and working a conventional number of hours (e.g. full time).  He shows that 
taxation reduces the incentive to participate if and only if the marginal utility of income 
has an elasticity less than one. 
  The existence of incentive effects associated with taxation implies that the pursuit 
of equity through taxation comes with a cost in the form of deadweight loss that must be 
  21taken into account when evaluating the distributive effect of taxes.  This requires an 
evaluation criterion that combines both efficiency and equity concerns.  The generalized 
Lorenz curve is such a criterion.  It is obtained by multiplying the ordinary Lorenz curve 
by the mean of the distribution.  One can also resort to an abbreviated social evaluation 
function defined as the mean of the distribution times one minus an index of relative 
inequality (e.g. Gini or Atkison).  Given that positive taxation can only reduce social 
welfare if we do not account for the redistribution of the proceeds, in what sense then is a 
progressive tax socially desirable?  For sure, it reduces inequality.  But this does not 
mean welfare improvement.  Lambert (2001) explains that a progressive income tax is 
socially desirable relative to an equal-yield flat tax because it reduces social welfare less 
than the latter if both apply to the same pre-tax incomes. 
 
2.3. Ability of a Tax System to Redistribute Wealth and Income 
 
  As noted earlier, the basic function of a tax system is to raise revenue to fund 
government activities.  Given that equity is also an important development objective, it is 
useful to consider the extent to which taxes are able to affect the distribution of income 
and wealth.  We also examine here tax provisions designed to reduce the tax burden on 
poor people.  It is evident that the answers to these questions depend on the instruments 
used. 
  Zolt (2008) notes that a progressive tax system transfers to the state a proportion 
of a taxpayer’s net increase in wealth (i.e. income) that otherwise would have been spent 
or saved.  Thus individual income and wealth taxes are the instruments most capable of 
redistributing income.  The effectiveness of the corporate income tax depends on the 
prevailing shifting pattern.  Generally speaking, the factors determining the progressivity 
of an income tax system include: the top marginal tax rate, the base, the number of 
deductions and the compliance rate.  A system with moderate top rates (i.e. around 30 
percent), a broad tax base, few deductions and high compliance rates is likely to be more 
progressive than one with high top personal rates (around 50 percent), a narrow base, 
many exemptions and high degree of tax evasion. 
  22  To address poverty issues directly, the individual income tax system can be 
integrated into the social welfare program to provide cash transfers to low-income 
individuals.  However, it is important to take account of the relative efficiency and 
feasibility of using the income tax this way as the administrative cost is bound to 
increase.  Policymakers can also adopt provisions to reduce the tax burden on the poor.  
One possibility is to set a high threshold relative to the poverty line to exempt poor 
people from income tax.  This is reflected by a tax structure with a tax-free threshold 
below which the tax rate is zero.  Such a threshold must be chosen carefully as it can 
distort incentives for earning income above it.  The jump from a tax-free threshold to the 
first taxable income band can lead to a marginal tax rate that is so high to discourage the 
people involved from earning the additional income
21. 
  There are institutional weaknesses that limit significantly the progressivity of 
income tax in developing countries.  First of all, many potentially taxable transactions 
take place in a sizable informal sector of the economy.  Thus revenues for income tax 
represent about 2 percent of GDP in developing countries compared with 11 percent of 
GDP in developed countries (Zolt 2008).  Second, a weak tax administration combined 
with the ability of residents to shift assets outside the country limits the collection of 
income tax on formal sector wage income only. 
The above limitations of income tax have forced developing countries to rely 
more on indirect taxes on goods and non-factor services (such as sales, excise and value 
added taxes).  But taxes on consumption tend to be regressive due to the fact that poor 
people generally spend a higher proportion of their income than non-poor.  There are 
ways of reducing the regressive character of these taxes.  In the case of a VAT for 
instance, the authorities could lower the tax rate (including complete exemption) on a 
handful of basic foodstuffs such as rice and cooking oil.  The use of broad commodity 
groups such as food would not do since households at all income levels consume these 
commodities.  One standard recommendation is to tax heavily certain luxury goods that 
are most likely consumed by high income households.  Creedy (2001) notes this approach 
                                                 
21 This is particularly the case if earning additional income implies a reduction in transfer payments or other 
forms of social assistance.  This would amplify the jump.  Relief can also be provided to low-income 
people through special deductions or credits designed to reduce the after-tax costs of certain categories of 
expenditures such as, education, medical or job training expenses (Zolt 2008). 
  23is not likely to produce much revenue let alone affect the distribution of income in view 
of the fact that high-income households are more able to substitute away from 
commodities that are highly taxed.  Furthermore, differentiation by narrow commodity 
groups or brand name entails administrative costs. 
 The  above  considerations  reveal the difficulties associated with using the tax 
system in developing countries to redistribute income and wealth.  They also point to 
desirable properties of a tax system in terms of breadth of the base, level of rates, number 
of exemptions and administrative capabilities. 
 
3.  Incidence of Public Expenditure 
 
  Analyzing the incidence of public expenditure is analogous to tax incidence 
analysis.  The key questions under consideration are the following: (1) Who benefits from 
public expenditure and by how much? (2) Is the implied distribution of benefits socially 
desirable? (3) What is the welfare impact of public spending?  This section reviews the 
current practice in answering the above questions.  It starts with the basic approach to 
benefit incidence analysis which provides a profile of the distribution of benefits from an 
expenditure program along the distribution of some indicator of the living standard (i.e. 
income or consumption).  If the distribution of benefits is regressive, then the expenditure 
program reduces inequality
22.  We next review some simple approaches designed to 
account for behavioral responses to public spending.  These behavioral responses 
ultimately determine the distributional outcome of the expenditure program and its 
welfare impact.  Finally we note the need for assessing the combined incidence of 
taxation and public expenditure. 
                                                 
22 Recall that an income tax is progressive if higher income brackets pay a higher proportion of their 
income in taxes.  In other words, the ratio of tax to income is an increasing function of income.  Given that 
benefits from public expenditure are added to income (and not subtracted as taxes), an expenditure program 
is progressive if the ratio of benefits to income is a decreasing function of income.  That is benefits are 
regressively distributed (Lambert 2001). 
  243.1. Standard Benefit Incidence Analysis 
 
Valuation Issues 
  The estimation of the benefits derived from public expenditure is fraught with 
serious valuation issues.  Public expenditure can take the form of cash transfers, subsidies 
or direct provision (by the state) of goods and services.  While it may be easier to 
measure cash transfers to households or individuals it is very difficult to measure the 
benefits accruing to individuals or households from publicly provided goods and services.  
The market system provides a convenient way of valuing private goods sold on the 
market.  This convenience stems from the fact that the price of a good or service reflects 
the marginal benefit to the consumer.  In general this approach does not work in the case 
of public goods because their supply is either rationed or does not adjust to demand.  
Under these circumstances, whatever price is charged (e.g. user fee) cannot signal 
marginal benefit or the willingness to pay (Martinez-Vazquez 2008).  The solution 
adopted in the context of benefit incidence analysis is to value benefits from an 
expenditure program on the basis of the unit cost of provision. 
  A number of practical decisions must be made in estimating unit cost.  These 
issues relate particularly to the treatment of capital expenditure and of cost recovery.  
Most estimates are based on current expenditure.  However, Demery (2003) explains that 
if capital spending is to be included in the calculations, this must be done only through 
the value of the services flowing from this capital.  With respect to cost recovery, he 
suggests that only fees that are returned directly to the treasury must be netted out of 
gross spending.  Fees that are retained by the service providers such as schools or clinics 
should not be subtracted from gross spending because presumably they are used to 
improve the quality of the service. 
To obtain a distribution of the benefit from public spending, one combines 
information on the cost of provision with data on the use of the relevant public goods and 
services.  Thus the analysis can be applied only to assignable public expenditure (Demery 
2003), that is expenditure for which beneficiaries can be identified.  This poses a serious 
problem because most public goods are non-rival to the extent that every unit can be 
enjoyed fully by all people.  In view of this fact, benefit incidence analysis is usually 




  The construction of the distribution of benefits associated with a particular public 
expenditure program involves the following three basic steps: (1) using data from public 
expenditure accounts and the operation of the program under study, estimate the unit cost 
or subsidy associated with the public service in question; (2) from household survey data, 
estimate the rate of use
23 of the service by each household and impute the benefits on the 
basis of these estimates; (3) report the results by policy-relevant socioeconomic groups 
(e.g. by quantiles of the distribution of some welfare indicator, or by region, gender or 
ethnic groups). 
  To see some of the computations involved, we consider the case of public 
education as explained by Demery (2003).  Let j=1, 2, …, m represent policy-relevant 
socioeconomic groups.  Let i=1,2,3 stand for the usual three levels of education, primary, 
secondary and tertiary.  Furthermore, let Ri represent the total public school enrollment at 
level i, and Rij the enrollment from group j.  Finally, let S and Si stand respectively for 
total government subsidy and the amount of subsidies going to level i.  The total amount 


















        (3.1) 
Expression (3.1) is written in a way that clearly shows that the benefit incidence of 
education spending allocated to group j for each level of education is equal to the 
enrollment of the group at that level of education times the unit cost.  The expression can 
also be normalized by S to yield the share of the total education spending imputed to 
group j, bj.  The result can be written as follows: 






















b         (3.2) 
                                                 
23 In the case of education and health, this information relates to enrollment rates or clinic visits reported by 
members of a household. 
  26In the above expression (3.2), rij stands for the share of group j in total enrollments at 
level i, while si represents the share of total of public spending on education going to 
level i. 
  One interesting approach to incidence analysis does not require an estimate of a 
unit subsidy.  It notes only whether or not a service is used by a household.  One can then 
define a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the service in question is used and 
zero otherwise.  The analysis is thus based on the distribution of this dummy variable 
across socioeconomic groups. 
One way of determining whether or not an expenditure program is progressive is 
to consider how the share of the benefits relative to the income of the recipients varies 
across income quantiles.  If this share declines as we move from the poorest to the richest 
quantiles
24, the underlying expenditure program is progressive.  Table 3.1 shows an 
example based on the incidence of public spending on health in Ghana in 1992.   
According to these results, the underlying spending program is progressive because, for 
the poorest quintile, the subsidy represents 3.5 percent of total household expenditure 
compared to 1.8 for the richest quintile (Demery 2003). 
 
  Table 3.1 Incidence of Public Spending on Health in Ghana (1992) 
 
Quintile Per  Capita 
Subsidy 
(Cedis) 
Share of Total Subsidy 
(%) 
Subsidy as Share of Total Household 
Expenditure 
1 2296  12  3.5 
2 3065  15  3.1 
3 3692  19  2.8 
4 4228  21  2.3 
5 6515  33  1.8 
Ghana 3959  100  2.4 
Source: Demery (2003) 
  In general, one can compare the concentration curve of the imputed benefits with 
the Lorenz curve of the reference welfare indicator (e.g. income or consumption 
                                                 
24 Hence the distribution of benefits is regressive. 
  27expenditure) to determine the progressivity of a public expenditure program.  If the 
concentration curve lies everywhere above the Lorenz curve of the welfare indicator, we 
conclude that the expenditure program is progressive.  The associated benefits are more 
equally distributed than the reference welfare indicator. 
  It is instructive to examine formally the comparison of concentration curves 
discussed above.  Let LX stand for the Lorenz curve of original income.  That is before 
benefits are imputed to income units.  Let KB and KY stand respectively for the 
concentration curves for the benefits and for post-benefit income.  Lambert (2001) shows 
that benefits are regressively distributed (meaning that the public expenditure program is 
progressive) if and only if the concentration curve for benefits dominates that for post-
benefit income and the latter dominates the Lorenz curve for original income.  That 
is: .  X Y B L K K ≥ ≥
By definition, the concentration curve for the post-benefit income is a weighted 
average of the Lorenz curve for original income and the concentration curve for benefits.  
The weights depend on the average rate of benefit (or total benefit ratio) b.  Formally, we 












.  This definition implies the following relationship 
between a local measure of the redistributive effect and a local measure of 
disproportionality
25. 
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The same relation holds between global measures as follows: 







                                                
        ( 3 . 4 )  
Where G and C stand respectively for the Gini coefficient and the concentration index.  
The above two expressions reveal that the redistributive effect of an expenditure program 
can be decomposed multiplicatively into a level and a disproportionality component.  The 
redistributive effect of regressive benefits can be enhanced either by scaling up the 
 
25 The relation can be easily established in three steps: (1) multiply the definition through by (1+b); (2) 
subtract bLX from both sides of the result; (3) shift LX from the right to the left hand side, factor out 
appropriate terms and normalize the result by (1+b). 
  28benefits or by redistributing a given total of benefits more in favor of the poor (Lambert 
2001).  This is analogous to the case of a progressive income tax. 
  The extent to which the expenditure program is targeted to the poor can be judged 
on the basis of the comparison of the concentration curve for benefits with the line of 
equal distribution (the 45 degree line).  The further the concentration curve lies above the 
45 degree line, the better the targeting.  In this case
26, the poorest 100p percent of the 
population receives more than 100p percent of the total subsidies.  Targeting is weaker 
when the concentration curve of the benefits lies below the 45 degree line.  The results 
presented in table 3.1 reveal that the poorest received 12 percent of overall public health 
spending compared to 33 percent for the richest.  This is an indication of poor targeting 
of public health spending in Ghana in 1992. 




st Quintile  2
nd Quintile  3
rd Quintile  4
th Quintile  5
th Quintile 
Incidence 
Primary 25 23 19 18 14 
Secondary  18 19 22 20 21 
Share of School-Age Population 
Primary 24 22 20 18 16 
Secondary  24 21 20 19 16 
Sourec Al-Samarrai and Zaman (2007) 
  Another important way of assessing the equity of a spending program is to 
compare benefits received to needs.  Comparing the distribution of benefits to that of 
household income or expenditure does not tell the whole story as there could be 
significant differences in needs across income levels.  This point is well illustrated by the 
case on primary and secondary public education spending in Malawi presented in table 
3.2 (Al-Samarrai and Zaman 2007).  The results of this incidence analysis show that the 
poorest quintile has the greatest demand for both primary and secondary education.  Their 
share of the school-age population in both education sectors is higher than that of any 
other income group.  When compared specifically with the richest quintile, the 
                                                 
26 The associated concentration curve is concave and the corresponding concentration index is negative. 
  29information presented in table 3.2 reveals that public spending on primary education is 
pro-poor.  The share of the subsidies going to the poorest quintile is slightly higher than 
their share of the school-age population.  But, the incidence of public spending on 
secondary education favors the non-poor.  The poorest quintile, with 24 percent of the 
school-age population receives only 18 percent of the subsidy for secondary education.  




  Benefit incidence analysis can help identify who benefits from public services by 
combining information on unit costs of provision with data on the pattern of use of these 
services by households.  To draw proper policy implications from this type of analysis, it 
is important to understand what drives the observed distribution of benefits.  For sure 
there are supply and demand factors involved here.  The choice of the welfare indicator 
also plays a determining role.  In the case of social services (health and education), one 
important supply factor to consider is the allocation of public spending across sub-sectors 
(i.e. primary, secondary and tertiary).  Castro-Leal et al. (1999) study the effectiveness of 
public spending on social services in several African countries.  In general, they find that 
these services are not targeted to the poor.  One important reason they note is the 
allocation of public spending to different levels of service.  For instance, they find that 
significant shares of health budgets go to hospital based services, which are rarely used 
by the poor.  Thus, the composition of expenditure is a key determinant of its effect on 
different socioeconomic groups. 
  Demand interacts with supply to determine the targeting outcome for public 
spending.  The demand for public services is influenced by such factors as income, 
quality and costs (both opportunity and direct costs).  The study of public spending on 
social services in Africa by Castro-Leal et al. (1999) found that household spending on 
health and education increases with income.  They conclude that the demand for these 
services increases with income.  Thus one way of improving the targeting of these 
services to the poor is to divert to the private sector the demand by the better-off. 
 
  30Table 3.3. Incidence of Public Spending on Education is South Africa in 1994 
 
  Share of Primary Subsidy  Share of Education Subsidy 








1  18.9 25.8 14.1 19.9 
2  17.7 23.3 15.4 20.7 
3  16.5 19.7 16.0 19.7 
4  19.1 17.8 19.6 19.1 
5  27.8 13.5 34.9 20.3 
Source:  Castro-Leal (1996) as cited by Demery (2000) 
 
  The demand for public services is also sensitive to the quality of those services.  
The quality of health services depends on such things as drug availability, staff skills and 
the general upkeep of the facilities.  Castro-Leal et al. (1999) suggest that unit cost 
variations among socioeconomic groups can be considered a proxy for variations in the 
quality of the provided service.  They cite the case of South Africa under the apartheid 
regime where the pupil-teacher ratio in black schools was more than twice that in white 
schools.  These unit cost variations reveal indeed a greater degree of inequality both in 
the distribution of public resources and that of welfare outcomes than would an incidence 
analysis based on national average cost. 
This point is well illustrated, again with data from South Africa.  Table 3.3 
presents results from an analysis of public expenditure on education in South Africa 
based on two different estimates of unit cost.  One is race-specific while the other is an 
average across races.  The results based on the mean unit subsidy are misleading.  They 
would lead one to believe that in 1994, the poorest quintile got about 26 percent of the 
total subsidy for primary education versus 14 percent for the richest.  For the overall 
education subsidy, the use of the mean unit subsidy implies that each quintile received 
more or less it proportionate share of public spending on education.  Race-specific unit 
subsidies tell a different story.  For primary education, the results based on this measure 
reveal that the poorest quintile got 19 percent of the subsidy compared to 28 percent 
going to the richest.  For overall spending on public education, calculations based on 
  31race-specific unit cost show that the poorest quintile got about 14 percent of the subsidy 
compared with 35 percent for the richest. 
 There  are  costs associated with the use of public services, even for services that 
are provided free of charge to the household.  Some of these are transaction costs to the 
extent that they must be incurred in order to gain access to the service.  These include 
mainly transportation and the opportunity cost of the time use to get the service (Demery 
2000).  In addition, one should consider household spending that enhances the benefits 
obtainable from the publicly provided service.  In the case of education, these 
expenditures would cover such things as books, uniforms, and other school supplies.  The 
total cost of access and use can represent a significant burden
27 for low income 
households and limit their use of the service.  In education such costs have been found to 
explain non-enrollment or drop-outs.  A recent evaluation of the welfare impact of rural 
electrification by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank found that 
even in villages that have been connected to a national grid for 15 to 20 years, one can 
still find 20 to 25 percent of households unconnected because they cannot afford the 
connection fee.  A major implication of this state of affairs is that tariff structures 
designed to be progressive end up being regressive subsidy schemes (World Bank 2008). 
  Finally, we note that benefit incidence results may be sensitive to the choice of 
the welfare measure.  As noted earlier, accounting for need differences across income 
levels can reveal more inequality than standard benefit incidence analysis would.   
Demery (2000) explains that such demographic differences across quintile are partly due 
to the use of per capita total expenditure as the welfare indicator.  Such differences may 
indeed be attenuated or disappear all together if one were to assign individuals to 
quintiles on the basis of per adult equivalent expenditure.  To demonstrate this point, the 
author cites a benefit incidence study of public education in Ghana (1992).  When the 
population is ranked on the basis of per capita expenditure, it is found that the poorest 
quintile gets about 22 percent compared with 17 percent when per adult equivalent 
expenditure is used as the welfare indicator.  In contrast, the share of the richest quintile 
increases from 14 percent to about 18 percent. 
                                                 
27 The extent of this burden can be assessed on the basis of the affordability ration.  In the case of health 
this ratio compares household spending per visit with its per capita non-food expenditure (Demery 2003). 
  32There is a deeper issue with the choice of a welfare measure given that the 
underlying concept of living standard is multidimensional.  Standard benefit incidence 
analysis ignores this fact to the extent that it translates all public spending, whether in 
cash or in-kind, into the equivalent monetary transfer and evaluates the implied changes 
in the distribution of income (van de Walle 1998).  Yet, as noted in the introduction, 
public policy ultimately seeks to improve people’s lives.  Thus, in the context of social 
expenditure for example, we are in fact more interested in knowing whether health status 
has improved as a result of public spending on health care, or whether spending in 
education leads to improved literacy and numeracy. 
Hammer et al. (1995) recognize this issue in their assessment of the distributional 
effects of social sector expenditures in Malaysia.  In particular, they note that spending on 
health and education is a productive investment in human capital.  This observation led 
them to broaden their incidence analysis and seek to determine the extent to which the 
improvement in health and education status in Malaysia between 1974 and 1989 was a 
result of government policy.  Using regression analysis
28, they found that immunization 
and the provision of safe water had the strongest and most robust effects on health 
outcomes.  They also concluded that public expenditure on primary education 
significantly improved outcomes. 
 
3.2. Accounting for Behavioral Responses to Public Spending 
 
  The interaction of demand and supply factors discussed above suggests that the 
way individuals react to an expenditure program is crucial in determining both the 
welfare and the distributional outcome of such a program.  Ignoring behavioral responses 
to a spending program is bound to introduce some bias in the estimates of the 
                                                 
28 The analysis for health applies OLS, fixed and random effects models to a panel of state-level data for 
1986-1989.  The dependent variables are infant and maternal mortality rates.  Explanatory variables 
include: (1) average state income, (2) immunization rate, (3) the proportion of the population with safe 
water, (4) the number of doctors per capita who are publicly assigned.  Educational outcomes are measured 
by schooling transition rates or repetition rates.  In the case of primary school, the dependent variable is the 
proportion of students in the last year of the primary level who continue on to the lowest grade of the 
secondary level.  The independent variable include: (1) income, (2) public expenditure per student, and (3) 
the percentage of state income accounted for by agricultural production.  According to the authors, this last 
variable acts as a proxy for the opportunity cost of students’ time. 
  33distributional impact of the program in question.  In section 4, we will present more 
elaborate ways of modeling behavior and interaction in the context of fiscal incidence 
analysis.  For now we focus on some basic tools for taking behavioral response into 
account when analyzing the incidence of public spending.  These simple methods rely on 
reduced form relationships between interventions and outcomes.  They do not attempt to 
bring out all behavioral inter-linkages that may explain the outcome (van de Walle 2003). 
  There are two situations where behavioral approaches are particularly relevant.  
The first concerns the construction of a counterfactual distribution of welfare against 
which the impact of a spending program is to be judged.  The second situation pertains to 
the assessment of the distributional implications of a program expansion.  This latter case 
is known as marginal incidence analysis. 
  Fundamentally, the incidence of an expenditure program (or any public policy for 
that matter) entails a comparison of the distribution of a welfare indicator (such as 
income) with and without the given program (or policy).  Reliable information on the 
counterfactual, that is the distribution of welfare that would have prevailed in the absence 
of the expenditure program, is necessary for an accurate estimation of incidence.  A 
reliable counterfactual is also needed if we are to make any causal inference about the 
expenditure program for policy purposes.  This is due to the fundamental fact the effect 
of a cause can be understood only in relation to another cause (Holland 1986).  The 
behavioral responses of socioeconomic agents to public policy must therefore be 
accounted for properly to improve the representation of the state of the world that would 
have prevailed in the absence of the policy under consideration.  Indeed there is evidence 
that an expenditure program can affect such behavior as savings, labor supply and 
schooling choices.  It can even crowd out private transfers received by households.   
Behavioral approaches are considered as attempts to resolve the counterfactual problem 
(van de Walle 1998). 
Regression analysis of the type described above in the context of the Malaysia 
study represents the simplest way of accounting for behavioral responses and hence 
improving the definition of the counterfactual.  One can specify a linear regression model 
where a welfare indicator is a function of program participation and individual 
characteristics (both observable and non-observable).  To be meaningful, this 
  34specification requires a sound understanding of the rules that govern budget allocation 
and program placement.  This understanding is also crucial to deal effectively with the 
potential problem of endogeneity that can confound the causal interpretation of the 
results
29. 
  Behavioral approaches are also relevant in the context of marginal incidence 
analysis which seeks to determine who benefits from the expansion of an expenditure 
program (or who loses from a cut in public spending).  The standard benefit incidence 
method predicts that people gain or lose in proportion to the benefits they are currently 
receiving under the program.  This might be the case for a policy (e.g. a subsidy) that 
changes the price of a commodity proportionately.  In general, one should not expect the 
additional benefits from an expanded program to go to current beneficiaries.  Even if they 
do flow to them, it is not necessarily in proportion to their current benefits.  Indeed, the 
socioeconomic composition of participants can change dramatically as the program 
expands or contracts (Lanjouw and Ravallion 1999). 
  Several methods have been proposed to deal with this issue.  Younger (2003) 
notes the following three.  The first method relies on spatial variations in program 
coverage.  The second is based on changes induced by program expansion over time.  
The last approach relies on econometric analysis to estimate either compensating 
variations or changes in the probability of participation.  The first method emerged from 
a study by Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) of the relationship between program size and 
the composition of program participation
30.  These authors argue that the distributional 
                                                 
29 Endogeneity would arise if the policy variable (this could be a dummy variable indicating program 
participation) is correlated with unobservable characteristics of the household as represented by the random 
disturbances in the regression equation.  Under these circumstances, the use of standard OLS would lead to 
a biased and inconsistent estimate of policy impact.  This correlation can stem from at least three sources 
(van de Walle 1998).  Placement into the program could be determined in part by the welfare indicator used 
to measure program performance, for instance assigning a nutrition program on the basis of nutritional 
status.  (This would lead to simultaneity bias).  Trouble could also stem from the fact that there is a variable 
that explains both placement and outcomes, yet this in not included in the model.  The existence of regional 
or community level fixed effects or time varying effects that determine both outcomes and placement 
illustrates this case.  Finally, self-selection can cause endogeneity.  Statistical solutions to this problem 
include the use of panel data and fixed effects models, instrumental variable techniques and randomization. 
30 Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) explain that program participation is homogeneous of degree one if 
group-specific participation rates stay the same as the program expands.  For instance if 100p percent of the 
participants are poor when the program operates at level 1 with a given number of participants, then 100p 
percent of participants are also poor when the program expands to level 2, covering more people.  Thus, 
standard benefit incidence analysis assumes homogeneity.  If the poor are able to capture program benefits 
at certain points in time and not others, then participation is said to be non-homogeneous.  This would be 
  35impact of a program expansion hinges on the political process that governs the allocation 
of program’s outlays.  In particular, it depends on the ability of different socioeconomic 
to influence that process. 
  These political economy considerations led the authors to propose a simple 
regression model linking, for each quantile, the participation rate for a region within a 
given state
31 to an instrument for the state’s average participation rate.  More precisely, 
quantiles are defined over the entire rural population ranked by total consumption per 
capita
32 (normalized by state-specific poverty lines).  The assessment of marginal 
program incidence is based on the marginal odds of participation.  This is the increment 
in program participation rate of a given quantile associated with a change in aggregate 
participation
33.  Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) note that, for a given quantile, variations 
of its participation rate across regions depend on the size of the program in the state to 
which each region belongs.  The size of the program is measured by the state’s average 
participation rate.  This latter variable is instrumented by the so-called “leave-out mean”, 
which is the state average participation rate computed without the participation rates for 
the specific region and quantile under consideration.  Following Younger (2003) the 
underlying regression model can be written as follows:  q k q q q k r x p ε β α + + = , , .  The left-
hand side is the participation rate for quantile q in region r of state k, and xk is the 
instrumental variable
34.  The coefficient βq measures the marginal odds of participation 
for quantile q.  Estimates of these coefficients are interpreted as the gain in subsidy 
                                                                                                                                                 
the case if poor people live in remote areas and the program expands geographically starting with less 
remote regions. 
31 The authors applied the methodology to rural India taking advantage of large observed differences across 
Indian states in the size of each program considered namely: (1) a means-tested credit scheme known as the 
Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP); (2) the Public Distribution System (PDS) which is a food 
rationing program; and (3) a public works scheme.  There are 62 regions spanning 19 states.  The data used 
are from the 1993-1994 National Sample Survey (NSS). 
32 Ajwad and Wodon (2001) propose a variant of Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) approach.  The basic 
difference between the two methods lies in the ranking of households in order to create quantiles.  Instead 
of defining quantiles on the basis of the overall distribution of welfare, Ajwad and Wodon would define the 
relevant quantiles on the basis of distribution of welfare within each state. 
33 The proportion of households in a given quantile that participate in the program is the average 
participation rate.  The average odds ratio of participation, for a given quantile, is equal to its participation 
rate divided by the overall average participation rate. 
34 Using the state average participation including the region and quantile under consideration would create 
an endogeneity problem that would lead to biased estimates.  Younger (2003) suggests that when possible, 
one can use panel data on regions to control for regional fixed effects.  He also notes that grouping 
observations into regional and quantile averages entails a loss of efficiency in estimation.  He thus 
recommends the use of individual level data. 
  36incidence per capita for each quintile as a result of a one dollar increase in aggregate 
program spending (Lanjouw and Ravallion 1999). 
  The Lanjouw-Ravallion method described above relies on a single cross-sectional 
data set.  It is possible to infer marginal incidence of a program based on simple 
comparison of incidence at different points in time.  This comparison requires the 
availability of at least repeated cross-sectional data.  Take the case of a given level of 
education for instance and let Rqt be the number of students from quantile q enrolled in 
that level of schooling in year t=1,2.  Let Rt stand for total school enrollment for that 
level in year t.  The changes in incidence over time across quantiles can be looked at in 

































q .Studies based on the comparison of incidence at different points in 
time include Hammer, Nabi and Cercone (1995) for Malaysia, and Al-Samarrai and 
Zaman (2007) for Malawi.  In particular, the Malawi study compared the incidence of 
public expenditure on education (primary and secondary level) between 1990/91 and 
1997/98.  It was found that, the changes in incidence were pro-poor.  The improvement 
for the primary level of education is attributed to the abolition of fees decided by the 
government in 1994. 
  Finally, one can apply discrete choice models
35 to marginal impact analysis by 
estimating the probability of participation in a program.  Participation is assumed to 
provide the highest level of utility relative to available options.  Thus, the estimated 
probability is viewed as the expected demand for the services provided by the program.  
In the context of education for instance, the underlying utility is usually taken to be a 
function of school quality, household and individual characteristics.  Estimated 
probabilities are interpreted as expected enrollment rates.  Changes in these probabilities 
(of participation) induced by program expansion provide a measure of marginal incidence 
that can be reported by quantile.  Alternatively, one can estimate the underlying random 
utility model to conduct the analysis in terms of changes in compensating variation 
induced by the policy reform. 
                                                 
35 Section 4 contains a more detailed discussion of such models. 
  37  Younger (2003) applied the three methods outlined above along with the standard 
benefit incidence approach to estimate the marginal incidence of an expansion of 
secondary schooling in rural Peru
36.  Based on this comparative analysis, he offers the 
following general characterization of these methods.  The standard method also has a 
marginal interpretation in the case where the policy reform affects only current 
beneficiaries in proportion to their current benefits.  This is the case of homogeneous 
program participation also noted by Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999)
37.  Method 1 (based 
on marginal odds of participation) and method 2 (based on changes in incidence over 
time) assume invariance of the underlying political economy constraints and that these 
can be captured by the correlation between program size and the implied distribution of 
benefits.  Method three (based on discrete choice) is more behavioral to the extent that it 
relies directly on utility maximization to model participation and the willingness to pay. 
 
3.3. Incidence of the Net Tax System 
 
The ultimate question of interest in fiscal policy is the net incidence of fiscal 
policy or the combined incidence of taxes and public spending.  After all, taxes are 
mostly justified on the basis of expenditures that must be covered given an accepted role 
of government.  Furthermore, Lambert (2001) notes that a welfare rationale for taxation 
can be found only by considering the way public spending affects people’s economic 
well-being.  Given the importance of behavior in determining the welfare impact of 
policy, incidence analysis must account, to the extent feasible, for the interaction between 
tax and spending policies.  Indeed a progressive public spending program can dominate 
regressive taxation to make the overall impact progressive.  This dominance relation can 
also run the other way around.  Martinez-Vazquez (2008) notes for instance that a cost 
recovery scheme may be deemed regressive, yet if the proceeds are used to finance better 
health services for the poor, the whole operation will be progressive.  However, he adds 
that the fragmentation of the decision making process for budgetary policymaking 
                                                 
36 Recall that marginal incidence represents the distribution of benefits (losses) associated with program 
expansion (contraction). 
37 In the terminology adopted by these authors, the average and marginal odds of participation are equal 
only when participation is homogeneous. 
  38implies that fiscal incidence analysis is relevant only for the entire government budget (a 
quite difficult task in view of the information constraints one would face). 
Fiscal incidence analysis entails a comparison of the original income (without 
government activity) with final income (including taxes, transfers and benefits from 
spending).  The latter is obtained from the former as follows (Hemming and Hewitt 
1991).  Starting with original private income, allocate taxable cash transfers to obtain the 
distribution of total income.  Then subtract direct taxes to get the distribution of post-tax 
income.  Based on this distribution, assign indirect taxes, nontaxable cash and in-kind 
transfers to obtain the distribution of net income.  The distribution of final income is 
obtained by allocating benefits from public spending by net income classes.  
Lambert (2001) shows how to measure the progressivity of the net tax system by 
considering the associated redistributive effect.  To see what is involved, define the net 
tax schedule simply as:  ) ( ) ( ) ( x b x t x tN − = .  This is a function of the original income x.  
The operation of this schedule implies that final income is equal to original income minus 
taxes plus benefits.  If the first order derivative of this schedule is strictly less than one, 
then the concentration curve for final income is also the Lorenz curve for the same 









≡ , where g 
and b stand respectively for the total tax ratio and the benefit ratio.  The net redistributive 
effect can therefore be written as: 
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In terms of Gini and concentration indices, we have the following decomposition of the 
Reynolds-Smolensky index of net redistributive effect: 
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Expressions (3.5) and (3.6) show how both the distribution of the tax burden and that of 
benefits determine whether and to what extent final income is shifted from high incomes 
to low incomes.  It can be shown that if the tax burden is distributed progressively while 
benefits are distributed regressively, the net tax schedule will be progressive (Lambert 
2001). 
  39  Devarajan and Hossain (1998) offer a good example of net fiscal incidence 
analysis.  They compute, within a general equilibrium framework, the combined 
incidence of taxes and a group of public expenditures in the Philippines
38.  On the 
revenue side of the budget, they consider income and business taxes as well as indirect 
taxes including excise, import tariffs and VAT.  On the spending side, they focus on three 
major categories of expenditure believed to have significant distributional implications.  
These relate to infrastructure, health and education.  These three components of public 
spending account for about 30 percent of total public expenditure.  Their measurement of 
the incidence of direct taxes is based on the effective tax rate.  This is defined as tax 
revenue divided by the base.  Due to data limitations, the authors infer the incidence of 
public spending from regional pattern of expenditures and regional income distributions.  
The overall incidence of each component of expenditure is computed as a weighted 




Table 3.4.  Net Fiscal Incidence in the Philippines (1998-1989) 
Decile Taxes Expenditures Net  Incidence
1 20.8  46.9  -26.1 
2 20.5  22.2  -1.7 
3 20.1  17.5  2.6 
4 20.0  14.4  5.6 
5 19.8  12.2  7.6 
6 19.9  10.2  9.7 
7 20.1 8.7  11.4 
8 19.7 6.9  12.8 
9 19.7 5.1  14.6 
10 19.6 0.11  19.5 
      Source: Devarajan and Hossain (1998) 
 
                                                 
38 We consider the structure of their general equilibrium model in the next section.  Here, we focus mostly 
on the findings. 
39A key assumption underlying this approach is that the benefits from expenditures in any region are 
distributed uniformly within that region. 
  40  The overall results from this study are presented in table 3.4.  The share of the tax 
burden is more or less constant across deciles.  This means that the incidence pattern of 
taxes in neutral.  The authors explain that this is due to the fact that indirect taxes are only 
slightly regressive.  The net incidence is progressive due to the pattern of public 
expenditures.  In particular, public expenditures per capita are concentrated in the poorer 
regions of the country. 
 
4.  Modeling Fiscal Incidence  
 
 Fundamentally,  fiscal incidence analysis is an exercise in social impact 
assessment to the extent that it entails an evaluation of variations in individual and social 
welfare attributable to the implementation of fiscal policy.  This type of evaluation 
requires a social policy model that clearly links policy instruments to social outcomes.  
The modeling framework which organizes our discussion in this section relies on the 
basic view that the distribution of economic welfare in a given society depends critically 
on individual behavior and endowments, and the socio-political arrangements that govern 
social interaction.  Once the observed outcomes are explained, their social desirability is 
assessed on the basis of an evaluation function summarizing the value judgments 
presiding over the evaluation.  We can therefore think of a social policy model as having 
two components, a positive one that explains outcomes and a normative one that rank 
them socially.  We review both the microsimulation and the general equilibrium 
approaches to fiscal incidence modeling. 
 
4.1. Microsimulation Models 
 
Overview 
  What is a microsimulation model?  A microsimulation model is a logical 
representation of the behavior of individual agents and their socioeconomic environment 
used to simulate the consequences of a policy reform on the level of activity or welfare 
for each individual in a representative sample of the whole population.  Three basic 
inputs are required for building and running a microsimulation model (Bourguignon and 
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socio-demographic characteristics of individuals or households; (2) the policy rules to be 
evaluated; (3) a theoretical model of individual response to policy. 
  Standard economic analysis relies on the optimization principle and the market 
system to explain individual behavior and social interaction.  Each agent attempts to 
implement the best feasible course of action.  Modeling optimizing behavior thus entails 
the specification of (1) actions that a socioeconomic unit can take, (2) the constraints it 
faces, and (3) the objective function used to evaluate such actions (Varian 1984). 
  Two basic approaches, both relying on the optimization principle, are commonly 
used to construct microsimulation models.  The first represents optimal behavior by an 
envelope function also known as the maximum value function (Dixit 1990).  This is the 
maximum attainable value of the objective function given the prevailing constraints.  The 
second approach is based on discrete choice models.  These models seek to explain the 
behavioral process that leads to the choice made by an agent facing a discrete choice set
40 
(Train 2003).  The behavioral process is represented by a function linking the agent’s 
choice to observed and unobserved factors.  The unobserved terms are taken to be 
random variables.  This randomness implies that the analysis must be conducted in terms 
of the probability of choosing an option from the choice set. 
  The usefulness of the microsimulation approach to policy evaluation is better 
appreciated when compared with the alternative based on representative agents.  For 
instance policy analysis based on two representative households such as rural and urban 
or even on six or ten regional groups can hide much of heterogeneity in agent’s behavior 
that explains variation in outcomes.  The fact that the microsimulation approach uses a 
micro-data set offers the possibility to fully account for the observed heterogeneity of 
socioeconomic agents (Bourguignon and Spadaro 2006).  Thus the approach provides a 
more precise way of identifying likely winners and losers from a policy reform.  It also 
improves the accuracy in evaluating the impact of a policy on the government budget.  
We now consider the use of microsimulation models in fiscal incidence analysis. 
 
                                                 
40 A choice set is said to be discrete if it contains a finite number of all possible alternatives that are also 
mutually exclusive from the point of view of the decision maker (Train 2003).  When a choice set contains 
all possible alternatives, we say that the set is exhaustive. 
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The Envelope Model 
  Under the standard assumption that the consumer has an exogenous budget, y, to 
spend on a set of commodities at fixed prices within a period of time
41, indirect utility is 
the maximum attainable utility given the outlay and the prevailing prices.  This function 
can be formally written as:  ] ); ( [ max ) , ( y q p q u p y v
q
= ⋅ = , where q is an m-dimensional 
vector of quantities of commodities and p the corresponding vector of consumer prices.  
As noted earlier, the corresponding cost function is the minimum expenditure required to 
achieve a given level of utility at given prices.  The indirect utility function shows the 
possible channels of transmission of policy impact to individual welfare.  Any policy 
changing prices or disposable income would affect individual welfare through changes in 
the budget constraint.  The budget constraint therefore can be thought of as a 
parameterized representation of the socioeconomic environment which mediates the 
effect of policy on welfare. 
The simulation of the welfare impact of policy relies on the envelope theorem 
(hence the name of the approach).  In the context of a parameterized optimization 
problem (as the one described above), the envelope theorem shows how to compute the 
impact of a parametric change on the objective function at the optimum.  According to 
the theorem, the change in the objective function induced by a change in a parameter 
while the choice variable adjusts optimally is equal to the partial derivative of the optimal 
value of the objective function with respect to the parameter (Varian 1984). 
In the particular case of fiscal policy, the welfare gain or loss from a marginal 
change in income tax is equal to the following:  y v v yΔ = Δ  where υy is the marginal 
utility of income.  This change in welfare can be expressed in terms of an equivalent 
variation in income as (Bourguignon and Spadaro 2006): y v v/ * y Δ = Δ .  The marginal 
utility of income is unobservable.  Its value must therefore be chosen on some normative 
basis. 
                                                 
41 In other words, the consumer is facing a linear budget constraint.  The institutional 
underpinning of this assumption consists of efficient markets with negligible transaction 
costs (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980) 
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computed similarly.  According to Roy’s identity (a manifestation of the envelope 
theorem), the Marshallian demand function of a commodity is equal to the negative of the 
first-order derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to the commodity price, 
divided by the marginal utility of income.  Thus, the welfare impact of price changes 
induced by a tax reform is equal to:  .  In terms of equivalent variation 
in income, we have:  .  In other words, an increase in an indirect tax rate 
on commodity k induces a price change that leads to a loss in real disposable equal to the 
change in price times the observed level of consumption. 
∑
=
Δ − = Δ
m
k










These equivalent variations in income can then be used to estimate the changes in 
the original income distribution induced by a fiscal policy reform.  Incidence analysis can 
then proceed along the lines discussed earlier.  As noted in section two above, one can 
also assess the progressivity of an indirect tax system on the basis of the price elasticity 
of a poverty measure.  In particular, a price increase (reduction) for a given commodity is 
considered pro-poor if it causes an absolute increase (reduction) in poverty smaller 
(greater) than a benchmark case.  By analogy to the Lorenz framework, one can choose 
as benchmark, a situation where everybody assigns the same proportion of real income to 
the purchase of the commodity in question.  The ratio of the observed poverty elasticity 
to the benchmark case is an indicator of pro-poorness or a measure of the distributional 
characteristics for the given commodity (Essama-Nssah 2007).  If this indicator is less 
than one, an increase in the price of the commodity would hurt the poor less than the non-
poor.  This can be used in an ex ante assessment of indirect tax policy options. 
Table 4.1 contains results from an application of this method to data for Guinea.  
They are estimates of the distributional characteristics for 19 components of food 
expenditure based on the Watts index of poverty and two measures from the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family, the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap.  On the 
basis of these results, there are 11 food items or groups that might deserve special 
consideration in the context of marginal commodity tax reform.  These include palm oil, 
smoked fish, rice (both local and imported), sugar, cereals, roots, grains, vegetables, oils 
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are those with higher budget shares for low-income households.  Of the 11 food items 
identified, cereals, roots and grains have the highest value for the indicator. 
The envelope approach to policy impact analysis has some limitations because 
one can only capture the static effects of the policy reform.  Furthermore, the fact that the 
envelope theorem is valid only in the neighborhood of the initial optimum makes the 
method inappropriate for the study of large price changes or in situations in which the 
household is out of equilibrium due to restrictions such as rationing.  These cases require 
an estimation of complete demand and supply systems. 
 
Table 4.1. Guinea (1994): Distributional Characteristics 
of Components of Food Expenditure 
  Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap Watts 
Beef 0.65  0.56  0.61 
Palm Oil  1.22  1.16  1.19 
Bread 0.78 0.72  0.75 
Fresh Fish  0.53  0.45  0.49 
Smoked Fish  1.10  1.14  1.12 
Local Rice  1.33  1.30  1.30 
Imported Rice  1.17  1.23  1.30 
Sugar 1.10 1.07  1.09 
Cereals 1.57  1.57  1.57 
Roots 1.53 1.56  1.55 
Grains 1.56  1.61  1.59 
Fruits 0.99 0.91  0.95 
Vegetables 1.26  1.28  1.28 
Meats 0.83 0.76  0.79 
Livestock 0.94  0.95  0.95 
Beverages 0.57  0.47  0.52 
Oils 1.14  1.08  1.10 
Sweets 1.04  1.01  1.03 
Canned Food  0.42  0.37  0.40 
Source : Essama-Nssah(2007) 
 
Discrete Choice Methods 
  A discrete choice model can be characterized in terms of two fundamental 
elements: the choice set and the decision process (or the decision rule).  As noted earlier, 
the choice set must be discrete and exhaustive, and the included options must be mutually 
exclusive.  In the case of discrete models of labor supply, for instance, the choice set can 
be represented by a few options such as not working, working part-time and working full 
  45time.  Just as in the case of the envelope model, the decision process assumes utility-
maximizing behavior.  The decision maker is thus assumed to choose the alternative that 
provides the greatest utility. 
  Since utility is not observed by the analyst, the decision process is usually framed 
with the logic of random utility models.  In that framework, utility has two parts.  The 
first, known as the representative utility (Train 2003), is a function of some observable 
characteristics of the decision maker and of the alternatives.  The second component is a 
set of non-observable random factors.  Formally, the utility function is written as: 
hj hj hj V U ε + = , where h represents the decision maker, j the alternative, V the 
representative utility and ε, the random factors.  The decision maker would choose 
alternative j if and only if  j i U U hi hj ≠ ∀ > .  Alternatively, this condition can be stated 
as, j is chosen if and only if the following holds ( ) ( ) j i V V hi hj hj hi ≠ ∀ − < −ε ε . 
Because of the uncertainty involved, we can only make probabilistic statements 
about the decision maker’s choice.  The probability that option j is chosen by agent h is 
defined as follows
42: 
  ( ) ( ) { } j i V V P hi hj hj hi hj ≠ ∀ − < − = ε ε Pr       ( 3 . 7 )  
The type of discrete choice model derived from the above probability statement is 
determined by the assumptions made about the distribution of the unobserved portion of 
the utility function.  For instance, the common logit model assumes that the random 
factors are independently and identically distributed (iid) extreme value variables for all 
options.  In other words, each choice is independent from the others
43. 
  Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) explain the use of discrete choice models in ex 
ante analysis of the incidence of tax-benefit reforms on labor supply.  They describe a 
general framework where the utility associated with an option is a function of some 
                                                 
42 The expression of this probability can be made more precise by considering an indicator function of the 
representative utility and unobserved factors.  The indicator is equal to 1 when option j is chosen and 0 
otherwise.  The probability that the agent chooses option j is then equal to the expected value of this 
indicator function over all possible values of the unobserved factors (Train 2003). 
43 The generalized extreme value model (GEV) allows correlation among unobserved factors.  The standard 
multinomial logit assumes that the random factors are iid with a double exponential distribution.  The 
probit model assumes that the random factors are jointly distributed normal variables.  Train (2003) points 
out that the identification of discrete choice models relies heavily of the fact that only differences in utility 
matter and the scale of utility is irrelevant. 
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unobserved factors which they refer to as idiosyncratic terms
44.  Disposable income 
depends on labor and non-labor income and the structure of the net tax system.  In this 
framework, tax-benefit reforms affect economic agents’ budget constraints by changing 
their disposable income.  The associated income effects combined with the substitution 
effect due to changes in after-tax wage rates induce a labor supply response. 
  An important methodological consideration in the probabilistic modeling 
framework described here concerns the proper way of conducting distributional analysis.  
The simulation of a policy reform produces for each individual in the sample, not a 
chosen option, but a probability distribution over the discrete alternatives listed in the 
choice set.  In the case of labor supply for instance, a simulation does not indicate the 
level of hours worked, but a probability distribution over the discrete hours in the choice 
set.  To trace the distributional implications in terms of changes in real income one can 
simply compute the expected income for each individual over all possible outcomes.  The 
computation is based on the net income associated with each level of hours contained in 
the choice set.  Buddelmeyer, Creedy and Kalb (2007) explain that this approach would 
understate the true variability of income in the population.  They propose alternative 
approaches that seem computationally challenging. 
  As noted earlier in section 3, there are situations where probabilities estimated 
from a discrete choice model can be interpreted as expected demand for a service and 
distributional impact analysis can proceed mainly on the basis of these probabilities.   
Glick and Sahn (2006) estimate a discrete choice model of primary schooling for rural 
Madagascar and evaluate several policy options on the basis of their distributional 
impact, and of cost to the government.  We briefly review their methodology and 
findings. 
  Parents with primary school-age children face three basic alternatives: no 
schooling, enrollment in public school, and enrollment in private school.  These parents 
are assumed to derive utility from the human capital of their children and from the 
                                                 
44 These idiosyncratic terms represent unobserved heterogeneity in agents’ behavior.  They nay explain 
response heterogeneity for agents who are observationally equivalent.  Their estimates are pseudo-residual 
from the econometric estimation.  For policy simulation this terms must be estimated in such a way that 
predicted behavior coincide with observed behavior. 
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function of school quality, individual and household characteristics, household income 
and the cost to the household of choosing a given schooling option
45.  A GEV 
specification is adopted for the random component of utility leading to a nested 
multinomial logit model to allow correlation among error terms across alternatives.  The 
estimated probabilities of choosing a schooling option are interpreted as demand 
functions or expected enrollment and provide the basic inputs for distributional impact 
analysis. 
  Glick and Sahn simulate the effects on primary school enrollment of the following 
policy options: (1) add teachers to schools to reduce multigrade teaching by 50 percent; 
(2) option 1 combined with an increase in public fees of 200 FMG (Franc Malgache, the 
local currency); (3) school consolidation leading to eliminate multigrade teaching.   
Multigrade teaching is a widespread practice in Madagascar whereby a teacher must 
handle every teaching day two or more classes.  Consolidation entails closing some small 
rural schools and using the cost savings to improve the quality of nearby schools. 
  The progressivity of each policy option is assessed on the basis of changes in the 
distribution of expected enrollment across expenditure quantiles.  Two specific criteria 
are used in this evaluation.  The first compares average benefit (i.e. enrollment) across 
quantiles before and after policy implementation.  The average benefit for each quantile 
is equal to the ratio of its share in overall enrollment to its share of primary school age 
population.  Let R and N stand respectively for overall primary school enrollment and the 
total population of primary school age children.  The corresponding variables for a given 








= .  This can also be expressed as the ration of the quantile-specific enrollment 
rate to the overall enrollment rate.  The second criterion involves normalized or relative 









                                                 
45 In the empirical specification is a linear equation where both the income and cost variables are made to 
interact with a dummy variable indicating the quintile of per capita expenditure to which the household 
belongs.  In this way, the model can capture separate price responses per quintile. 
  48  Table 4.2 presents estimated distributions of expected enrollments associated with 
three education policy options.  The first option entails a reduction in multigrade teaching 
through the provision of additional teachers.  Glick and Sahn estimated that a 50 percent 
reduction in multigrade teaching could be achieved by adding on average one teacher to 
each school currently using this method.  The results associated with this policy option 
indicate that it would be progressive to the extent that the increase in primary enrollment 
rate is larger for the bottom 3 quintiles than for the top two.  Specifically, relative 
marginal shares indicate that both the second and third quintiles’ share of the increase in 
the enrollment induced by the policy is proportionately 13 percent higher than their 
shares of the rural primary school age population. 
 
Table 4.2. Distributional Impact of Education Policy Options in Madagascar 
 
Quintile  Baseline Average Benefits Policy 1  Policy 2  Policy 3 
   A q M q A q M q A q M q 
1 0.77  0.78 0.97 0.76 0.38 0.78  0.87 
2 1.01  1.02 1.13 1.00 0.46 1.01  1.09 
3 0.98  0.99 1.13 1.00 1.69 0.99  1.13 
4 1.18  1.16 0.88 1.19 1.62 1.17  1.04 
5 1.38  1.34 0.69 1.38 1.23 1.35  0.78 
All 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
  Source: Glick and Sahn (2006) 
 
  For policy option 2 that combines option one with an increase in school fees, the 
results show that lower quintiles would lose while the top ones would gain in terms of 
changes in enrollments.  The bottom two quintiles would get respectively from new 
enrollments 0.38 and .46 of their school age population shares.  Adding cost recovery to 
option 1 risks to reverse the progressive nature of multigrade reduction
46.  The authors of 
the study suggest that this outcome might be avoided by structuring the cost recovery 
                                                 
46 Glick and Sahn also found that the demand for primary schooling by the poor is substantially more price-
elastic than that of the non-poor.  Thus increasing public school fees will increase inequality in the 
distribution of primary school benefits as measured by the distribution of enrollments.  This is the major 
behavioral factor explaining the distributional outcome of this simulation. 
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fees with the proceeds used to subsidize poor communities.  The political feasibility of 
this solution remains however an open question. 
  Finally the distributional implications of the last policy option, school 
consolidation, are qualitatively similar to those associated with the first option.  However, 
the authors note that this option is not viable because it would make primary schooling 
less accessible for many children.  Feasible options should be sought in the direction of 
adding teachers and classrooms to existing schools to reduce the need for multigrade 
teaching. 
 
4.2. The General Equilibrium Framework 
 
  Fiscal incidence is concerned with the impact of the operation of the public 
budget on the distribution of the living standard usually represented by the distribution of 
real income.  The estimation of fiscal incident entails the comparison of income 
distribution with and without the operation of the tax-benefit system under consideration.  
The traditional approach to incidence analysis is essentially a partial equilibrium one.  In 
the case of tax incidence, for instance, the allocation of the tax burden is based on some 
shifting assumptions within the confine of a given market.  McLure (1975) discusses the 
shortcomings of this approach.  In particular, he notes that the supply curve in one market 
represents the response of one industry to changes in relative prices taking into account 
interactions in markets for factors and for other products.  Yet, the standard partial 
equilibrium analysis fails to take these interactions into account, hence the appeal of the 
general equilibrium approach
47. 
  In this section, we focus on two basic issues.  The first concerns the determinants 
of incidence within a general equilibrium framework.  The discussion of this issue will 
refer to a simple analytical model and to an applied large scale general equilibrium 
model.  Both types of models rely on the representative household (RH) approach.  The 
                                                 
47 Devarajan, Fullerton and Musgrave (1980) compare the standard approach to general equilibrium 
analysis. 
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heterogeneity. 
 
The Representative Household Approach 
A general equilibrium model is a logical representation of a socioeconomic 
system wherein the behavior of all participants is compatible. The key modeling issues 
thus entail the following: (1) the identification of the participants, (2) the specification of 
individual behavior, (3) the mode of interaction among socioeconomic agents, and (4) the 
characterization of compatibility.  The basic Walrasian framework serves as a template 
for most applied general equilibrium models.  There are two basic categories of agents: 
consumers and producers, which are also referred to as households and firms.  The 
behavior of each economic agent is supposed to conform to the optimization principle, 
which holds that the agent attempts to implement the best feasible action. 
Interaction among economic agents is supposed to take place through a network 
of perfectly competitive markets.  Market interaction is a mode of social coordination 
through a mutual adjustment among participants based on quid pro quo (Lindblom 2001).  
Market participants are buyers and sellers whose supply and demand behavior is an 
observable consequence of the optimization assumption.  In this setting, behavioral 
compatibility is described in terms of market equilibrium.  General equilibrium is 
achieved by an incentive configuration (as represented through relative prices) such that, 
for each market, the amount demanded is equal to the amount supplied.  Alternatively, 
we can say that, when the economic system is in a state of general equilibrium, no 
feasible change in individual behavior is worthwhile, and no desirable change is feasible. 
The above characterization of a general equilibrium system leads to the 
fundamental view that fiscal incidence is determined by the underlying structure of the 
economy as represented by individual behavior and social interaction.  Incidence 
analysis in a general equilibrium framework can be traced back at least to Haberger’s 
classic 1962 paper on corporation income tax.  The Harberger model is a two-sector 
model that is consistent with the Walrasian template.  The economy produces two 
commodities  x and y, using two factors of production, capital and labor.  Perfect 
competition prevails throughout the economy.  Firms maximize profit subject to a 
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production is fixed and all factors are fully employed
48.  There are two representative 
consumers in the economy who own all factors of production.  Their income is therefore 
a function of relative factor endowments and possible transfers from the government.  
Consumers maximize utility subject to budget constraints.  Each such constraint can be 
written in terms of sources and uses of income.  This is a summary representation of the 
economic environment of the consumer that is affected by various taxes and public 
spending. 
  The Haberger model has been used to identify the determinants of fiscal incidence 
within a general equilibrium framework ( McLure 1975, McLure and Thirsk 1975a&b, 
Devarajan, Fullerton and Musgrave 1980).  We briefly consider some of the findings 
emerging from that work.  McLure and Thirsk (1975a) analyze the incidence of several 
types of taxes within this framework, including a tax on capital income in one sector, and 
selective commodity taxes.  In each case, they demonstrate how the tax affects both the 
sources and the uses of income for each representative socioeconomic group considered.  
In the case of corporate income tax in sector x of the economy, the immediate impact on 
the sources side is to reduce the net income received by the owners of capital or 
stockholders. 
What happens next depends on the degree of mobility of this factor of production.  
If capital is fully mobile, the owners will shift the factor from the taxed sector to the 
untaxed one (which has higher net returns) until net returns are equalized throughout the 
economy.  The assumed structure of the economy is such that the allocation and price of 
labor remained unchanged.  Thus the mobility assumption ensures that the burden of a 
corporate income tax in one sector of the economy is shared by all owners of capital 
throughout the economy. 
The incidence of the corporate income tax on the uses of income depends on two 
key elements: the induced change in relative commodity prices and the pattern of 
consumption.  In the particular case considered by McLure and Thirsk (1975a) the cost 
and price of output will rise in sector x relative to y.  The assumed pattern of 
consumption leads them to the conclusion that capitalists lose out relative to the workers 
                                                 
48 This implies that factor prices are fully flexible. 
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factor returns equalization nor would there be changes in relative commodity prices.  In 
that case, the entire burden would be borne by owners of capital in sector x.  Also, there 
would be no redistribution in the uses of income. 
  The case of a sales tax is analyzed in a similar fashion.  In particular, consider a 
sales tax imposed on the output of sector x, which is assumed to be capital intensive 
relative to the other sector.  In other words, the capital labor ratio in industry x is higher 
than the overall ratio in the economy (Devarajan et al. 1980).  Thus the price of capital 
will fall relative to that of labor.  The consumer with the more capital-intensive factor 
endowment would suffer a greater loss in nominal income.  The tax-inclusive price of 
commodity x would rise relative to the untaxed commodity.  As before, the impact on 
consumers’ economic welfare hinges on consumption patterns. 
  The above discussion of incidence analysis with the Harberger model clarifies the 
structural determinants of fiscal incidence.  A change in relative factor or commodity 
prices creates incentives for economic agents to change behavior.  When a tax lowers 
returns on one factor relative to another, because of the assumed optimizing behavior of 
economic agents, factor owners see this as a signal to shift the employment of the factor 
from the taxed sector to the untaxed industry.  The effective shift is limited by the degree 
of factor mobility possible given the institutional framework.  Perfect competition entails 
perfect mobility and price flexibility which lead to factor price equalization across sectors 
and changes in relative commodity prices.  Income losses or gains are determined by 
relative factor endowments.  The impact recorded on the uses of income is determined by 
consumption patterns.  
  While the Harberger model is useful in helping identify the key parameters 
underpinning fiscal incidence in a general equilibrium framework, the two-sector two-
consumer model of a closed economy is too simplified to fully capture the richness of 
behaviors and interactions observable in a real open economy.  The study by Devarajan 
and Hossain (1998) of net fiscal incidence in the Philippines discussed in section 3 above 
is based on a more elaborate computable general equilibrium model of an open economy.  
The authors highlight four features of this model that affect the interpretation of the 
results from empirical implementation.  First of all, domestic goods and imports in the 
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percent tariff on a given commodity will lead to less than 10 percent reduction in the 
price of the domestic substitute.  Second, the model accounts for inter-industry 
transaction through an input-output table.  This feature allows the model to track the 
cascading effect of an excise tax.  A tax on oil for instance will spread beyond final 
energy consumption to affect final goods whose production uses oil at some stage.  Third, 
the tax rates used are effective and not statutory.  Finally, simulations are conducted 
under a revenue neutrality constraint.  This means that if an indirect tax is removed, it 
must be replaced by an equal yield income tax that preserves government revenue.  This 
constraint allows the authors to focus on the pure price-distorting effects of the tax 
system. 
  Empirical implementation of CGE models of the type used by Devarajan and 
Hossain (1998) for fiscal incidence analysis requires a data framework that clearly shows 
both the sources and uses of income for each agent, and the interconnections among 
these.  A social accounting matrix (SAM) provides such a framework
49.  The matrix 
reflects the circular flow of economic activity for the chosen year (known as base year).  
It is an analytically integrated data set showing the interdependence of various aspects of 
the economy, such as production, consumption, trade, accumulation, and income 
distribution. 
Table 4.3.  Structure of a SAM for an Open Economy 
 
  Activity Commodity  Factor Household  Government  Investment World  Total 
Activity   domestic 
sales     export 
subsidies   exports  total  sales 
Commodity  intermediate 
consumption     household 
consumption 
government 
consumption  investment   total  demand
Factor  GDP at factor 
cost            GDP at 
factor cost 
Household     GDP at 




Government indirect  taxes  tariffs   income  tax        government 
revenue 
Savings      household 
savings 
government 
savings    foreign 
savings  total savings 
World   imports           total  imports
Total  production 









exchange   
Source: Adapted from Robinson (1989) 
 
                                                 
49 This account draws heavily from Essama-Nssah (2006). 
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institutional setting underlying the economy under consideration.  Each account is 
represented by a combination of one row and one column with the same label.  Each 
entry represents a payment to a row account by a column account.  Thus, all receipts into 
an account are read along the corresponding row, while payments by the same account 
are recorded in the corresponding column.  In accordance with the principles of double-
entry bookkeeping, the whole construct is subject to a consistency restriction that makes 
the column sums equal to the corresponding row sums.  This restriction also means that a 
SAM must obey Walras’ Law in the sense that, for an n-dimensional matrix, if the (n−1) 
accounts balance, so must the last one. Table 4.3 shows the structure of a SAM for a 
model of an open economy
50. 
 
Linking a CGE Model to a Microsimulation Module 
  The RH approach usually considers a limited number of representative 
households, anywhere between two (e.g. rural and urban) and 12.  In the context of 
analyzing the distributional impact of policies, Savard (2005) compares the performance 
of the standard RH-CGE framework with that of a two-module framework where a CGE 
is linked to a microsimulation model.  He finds that the modular approach outperforms 
the RH approach.  The basic reason for this outcome is the use of the RH entails a loss of 
information about heterogeneity in terms of agents’ behavior and endowments, a key 
determinant of policy incidence.  The information loss is a result of modeling aggregate 
outcomes presented in a SAM as if they represented the behavior of a group of 
homogenous agents.  In the extreme case where one focuses only on two representative 
households such as rural and urban, it is evident that much of the within-group 
heterogeneity (both behavioral and in endowments) is lost.  Yet, this heterogeneity 
underpins within-group variance in response to policy. 
If it is desirable to link a CGE model to a microsimulation model in order to 
improve fiscal incidence analysis, the issue then arises as to how this could be done.  One 
possible approach is to fully embed the household module within the CGE model so that 
                                                 
50 Note that the account labeled “Activity” represents the production sphere of the economy.  “Commodity” 
stands for markets and “World”, for the rest of the world. 
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thousands of households depending on data availability.  Boccanfuso and Savard (2007) 
call this approach the integrated multihousehold approach (IMH) and note several 
difficulties associated with its implementation.  The fact that these household must sit 
within the underlying SAM creates challenges for data reconciliation to ensure that the 
SAM balances.  Even if this step were successful, there is no guaranty that numerical 
resolution will be achieved easily.  A second approach described by these authors as the 
micro-simulation sequential (MSS) approach entails linking the two modules in a top-
down fashion through some linkage variables.  In this case the microsimulation 
component could be based either on the envelope or the discrete choice framework. 
Boccanfuso and Savard (2007) use a much simpler top-down approach to 
simulate for Mali the poverty and inequality implications of the removal of cotton 
subsidies in developed countries.  The CGE model is a standard representation of a small 
open economy with 17 sectors of production subject to constant returns to scale.  The 
assumption of small open economy implies that world prices are taken as given.   
Domestic goods are imperfect substitutes to foreign goods.  The CGE component 
includes a single representative household since household heterogeneity is handled at 
the level of the microsimulation module.  This bottom module is based on a sample of 
4,966 households.  Even though income and expenditure functions used in the 
microsimulation module are similar to the one for the RH in the CGE component, some 
behavioral heterogeneity is achieved by calibrating these functions not on the aggregate 
data in the SAM, but on household-specific information found in the survey.  The income 
equation for each household specifies the income of each household based on the sources 
and relative endowments observed in the survey.  Observed factor endowments are 
considered exogenous. 
  Fiscal incidence analysis within this framework is analogous to the envelope 
approach.  Given the baseline, change the tax-benefit system within the CGE model and 
simulate the variation in factor payments induced by this policy reform.  Bring these 
results into the microsimulation and use the income equations to estimate the implied 
variations in gross and disposable income.  Next, use variation in disposable income to 
  56infer variation in real consumption.  Standard indicators can then be computed to assess 
the distributional implications of the policy reform under consideration. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
  This paper surveys basic concepts, methods and tools commonly used in fiscal 
incidence analysis.  Such an analysis seeks to identify the winners and losers from the 
operation of the net fiscal system and to determine the social desirability of the associated 
distributional changes.  As such, it is an exercise in social evaluation generally 
understood as an assessment of variations in individual and social welfare attributable to 
the implementation of public policy.  In general, this evaluation entails a comparison of 
the distribution of an indicator of the living standard (e.g. real income or expenditure) 
with and without the tax-benefit system.  The assessment can also be based on the 
distribution of benefits and burdens associated with fiscal policy. 
  The effective distribution of benefits and burdens flowing from government 
intervention is an outcome of interaction among three types of decisions, the first two of 
which are collective while the last is individual.  The first collective decision determines 
the size of government from the appropriate role of the state in supporting individuals as 
they seek to realize life plans which they have reason to value.  This fundamental 
consideration gives legitimacy to a tax system.  The second collective decision concerns 
the value judgments defining social desirability for a distribution of net benefits from 
government activity.  Progressivity is the operative concept in assessing the redistributive 
effect of public policy.  Progressivity implies that benefits and burdens must be 
distributed disproportionately in favor of the poor.  Burdens should be distributed 
according to the capacity to bear and benefits according to needs.  Finally, one must 
account for individual reactions to these collective decisions.  A tax-benefit system 
creates incentives for individuals to adjust their behavior in order to maximize their share 
of benefits and minimize their share of burdens.  These reactive decisions attach a social 
cost to progressivity, the deadweight loss. 
  The interaction between collective and individual decisions creates a need for 
modeling approaches to account for individual behavior and social interaction.   
  57Behavioral approaches are particularly useful for the construction of a counterfactual 
distribution of economic to back up causal analysis.  Behavioral models are commonly 
based on the principles of optimization and market equilibrium.  The microsimulation 
approach offers the possibility to fully account for the observed heterogeneity of 
socioeconomic agents and improves the accuracy of the estimation of the budgetary 
impact of a given policy.  Computable general equilibrium models are more suitable for 
accounting for the interconnectedness of sources and uses of income of various agents.  
Such models are also designed to better track second and higher order effects of policy.  
Linking a general equilibrium model to a microsimulation model enhances the ability of 
the resulting framework to deal with both heterogeneity and general equilibrium effects. 
  There are a few policy design lessons that emerge from this review.  In principle, 
individual income and wealth taxes are the most capable of redistributing income.  The 
progressivity of such taxes depends on the base, the top marginal rate, the number of 
deductions and the compliance rate.  There are institutional factors, such as the existence 
of a large informal sector, that limit the effectiveness of income tax in developing 
countries.  This is why these countries tend to rely more on indirect taxes.  The 
regressivity of these indirect taxes can be reduced through targeted exemptions. 
  To draw proper policy implications from incidence analysis, it is important to 
fully understand what drives the observed outcomes along various dimensions of the 
living standard.  In particular, it is important to consider factors that prevent poor people 
from making use of available public services.  This consideration must go beyond 
economic to cover cultural and political economy factors.  Finally, standard incidence 
analysis focuses on the distribution of publicly provided inputs to the living standard.  
Since the ultimate goal of public policy is to improve people’s lives, two basic questions 
deserve special attention.  What type of a living do people manage to achieve from public 
spending out of tax revenues?  To what extent does fiscal policy equalize opportunities 
for well-being among citizens? 
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